

ON THE
D E F E N C E

OF

I R E L A N D: &c.

INCLUDING

O B S E R V A T I O N S

ON

SOME OTHER SUBJECTS CONNECTED THEREWITH.

*Si Sarraceni injurii fatigati, ab eis (Siculis) experiri discederent, et castra
forte maritima, vel montana munitiones occupaverint, ut hinc cum
Theutonici summa virtute pugnandum. Illinc Sarraceni crebris
insultibus occurrendum, quid putas acturi sunt inter has depressi
angustias, et velut inter malleum & incudem constituti?*

DUBLIN:

PRINTED BY P. BYRNE, No. 108, GRAYTON-STREET.

1795.



TO THE

R E A D E R.

THE Author is sensible, that the following sheets require more correction than it has been in his power to bestow on them. The observations they contain might have been arranged more methodically, and deduced more coherently. Strongly impressed with the perilous situation of the country, and in the habit of meditating on the train and vicissitude of human events, he is convinced that there is nothing possible, which may not be apprehended. It does not seem bad reasoning, to say, that whatever has happened elsewhere, similar causes may produce here; and it does not appear bad sense, to reflect seriously how we would act, were such things to occur here as have happened elsewhere.

In this slight sketch there is, at any rate, no wanderings of imagination, no abstract theories, no inapplicable speculations, none of those theoretical reveries, specious in the closet, but impracticable in the application. There is no opinion

A 2

which

which is not warranted by fact, or by authority;
nor any inference which analogy will not justify.

Time will shew, whether the man who palliates
and conceals the imminence of danger, or he
who probes the wound, and arouses to the true
sense of it, is the real friend of his country.

P. R. E F A C E.

THE military situation of Ireland is little understood; yet from local circumstances, as well as the extraordinary turn human affairs have taken within the last six years, it is likely to become the scene of important transactions. Its situation between the old and new worlds, its fine harbours, and the number of inhabitants, which the fertility of its soil, and its insular situation, enable it to maintain, have caused it, notwithstanding the misfortunes it has laboured under for five centuries past, to advance with rapid strides towards its proper station in the scale of nations; yet it is little known to its own inhabitants, and too little to its close ally and sister kingdom. It is hoped, that an humble endeavour to make both better acquainted with it, will, if successful, be attended with mutual advantages.

Ireland has seldom been inspected by a military eye. Those of its natives who aim at the profession, go where their hopes and ambition have a greater field; and the British military service is not exactly calculated to encourage application or study; for we see too many instances, where

where, after an officer has devoted his life (the best part of it) thereto, he finds the utmost to which he can extend his hopes, is permission to retire. That it is not in the field or the closet, but at the levee, that he ought to have employed his time; and that his application to his science has been thrown away, in acquiring knowledge, of which, when acquired, there is no one capable of judging, and which must therefore, in all probability, remain locked up in his breast for ever.

The only real military work wrote in the English language, is by General Lloyd: His two volumes, particularly his second, contain ideas that can never be too much revolved in a military man's mind. In this light they are considered by the officers of science on the continent: they prove the extent of his genius. What little more has been written in English, is merely compilation, some of which is selected with tolerable judgment, from the only good school, the Prussian; the rest consists of puerilities, which nothing but the gross ignorance of the nation, in every thing that regards that profession, could have enabled to pay for paper and printing.

However, such as they are, by dint of great names, lofty deductions, and long lists of subscribers, they contrive to hold their station upon the shelves of every man, who wishes to hold himself forth in the light of a martinet.

The

The yagers, or gamekeepers of the Austrian gentry, are in time of war formed into corps, receiving double pay. Each corps, in the seven years war, consisted of about two hundred. The utility of them must be obvious. They were all men of approved fidelity, and excellent marksmen; but the principal advantage derived from them was, that they could not be placed in a spot of the German empire, with which at least some of them were not intimately acquainted. Every mountain, defile, river and pass, they had a thorough knowledge of, and therefore could approach nearer the enemy, and watch his motions more closely and more safely, than any other corps of light troops whatsoever.

Of these corps, during the seven years war, one was commanded by Lloyd, the other by a most able officer, Edward Count Dalton, who served, as did several more of his family, the House of Austria for many years, with equal advantage to it, and credit to themselves. He finished his honourable career by a cannon shot at Dunkirk.

So much has been said of General Lloyd, prefatory to the introduction of certain observations quoted from his writings, part of which, the event has proved prophetic; what has not yet been proved so, it is to be hoped, wise measures and foresight will furnish the means of contradicting.

After

After describing the general strength of the French frontier, speaking of that part from Sedan to Dunkirk, he says: It has been the scene of successive wars for near two centuries; the most expensive, bloody and durable, of any recorded in the annals of mankind.

This line is stronger by art than by nature, having a prodigious number of strong fortresses and posts on it; moreover, it projects in many places, so that an enemy can enter it nowhere, without having some of them in front and on his flanks. His depots must be at Namur, Mons, and Tournay. An army of forty thousand men, and another of equal force about Condé, will so bridle his operations, that he cannot advance a step without imminent danger; for that which we suppose on the Sambre, by masking Namur, penetrates into the country to Brussels, &c. which will force the enemy to retire and abandon his own frontier. In the present state of Austrian Flanders, (1780), and the adjacent parts of Holland, nothing could prevent the two armies from overrunning the above-mentioned countries in one campaign.

Vol. II. page 181, Lloyd says: When the combined fleet appeared on our coast, the nation, unaccustomed to see an enemy so near, seemed much alarmed. I then thought it my duty to examine the possible results of an invasion, and pointed out the means of defeating it, (which he indeed

indeed effectually did); determined and fixed the lines on which the enemy must have acted; had he landed, and the different positions the English army must have occupied on such lines, to prevent him from advancing into the country, or keeping the post he had taken on our coast.

Vol. II. page 118, speaking of Rome, he says: *After the expulsion of their kings, it became a democracy, and every citizen was bred and trained a soldier; it was the only trade; the time not employed in war was given to agriculture; the chief occupation was war. Necessity first made that republic purely military. The right was in the people, but the power really in the senate. The senate, far from desisting from encroaching on the people, became daily more wanton in their oppressions. To secure their usurpations, the most proper method was to engage the people in continual wars, and thus keep numbers of them at a distance. The virtue and prowess of the soldier exalted the condition of the citizen; no human reward was refused to great military merit. With that knowledge, the fruit of ages, and with every motive which can excite a man to the vigorous exertion of his forces, such a people must necessarily become finally superior to every other people, placed in different circumstances.*

This

This difference alone rendered Rome, a military republic, superior to Carthage, a commercial one. The first species of republics must probably fall by the hands of a citizen, the last by those of a foreigner.

P. 115, he says: Carthage was often involved in wars, on account of its distant settlements. Their armies were sufficient against the people they contended with, when their operations were confined to their islands, and the coast, because their fleets could co-operate with success; and had they carried their views no farther, they might probably have existed many ages longer. But long and distant wars, supported only by money and mercenaries, brought on necessarily their distress and final destruction.

P. 117, speaking of a confederate army, he says: The views of the different parties seldom coincide in the various points, which occur in a long and extensive war: When opposed to such an army, temporize, use insinuations and seductions; some one or other of the parties will grow tired, and fall under the temptation; or attack vigorously the dominions of one of the members; this will create a powerful diversion, and his defection will probably break the confederacy.

If any thing in the following pages, can tend to convince the people of these countries, of
their

their alarming situation, of the danger of the enemy they are now at war with, and of the necessity of a general exertion of the whole people, and that they can place no reliance on foreign succour, the view with which they are written will be fulfilled.

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In the Course of the Year will be Published,

1. A Map of Ireland, to be annexed to this Publication, containing a general Sketch of its Positions, strong Passes, State as to Tillage, Forage, &c.—Its Roads, as calculated for Attack or Defence, and illustrative of the System of Defence proposed by Cordons.
2. A Map of Turenne's and Montecuculi's Operations on the Rhine.
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And other Plans, illustrative of the Military Operations quoted in this Work.

ON THE
D E F E N C E
OF
I R E L A N D.

CHAP. I.
OF ITS IMPORTANCE, &c.

*Of the Face of the Country—Coasts—Harbours—
Landing Places—Inhabitants—Towns—Natural
and Artificial Strength.*

IRELAND, situated at the extremity of the old world, has for some centuries back, been hardly known to it, farther than appearing an unimportant spot in the map of Europe. Yet this small spot is probably more essential, not merely to the consequence, but to the very existence of England, than all those exterior possessions, to retain or acquire which, she has been lavishing her blood and treasure, and accumulating debt upon her landed property for this century past. Extraordinary as it may appear, with all the advantages the island in question possesses, the benefits which England appears to have endeavoured to derive from her, have been merely negative. It seems as if the object of the sister kingdom had been not to derive good, but

to prevent the possibility of rivalry;—witness the restrictions on her trade, taken off a few years ago*.

But if England thinks it necessary for her, as she ever must, to maintain a navy for the defence, not only of her exterior possessions, but also of her own coast, the situation of Ireland points it out for the place of arms.

The westerly and south westerly winds which prevail in these latitudes for nine months in the year, are an insuperable disadvantage to England as a naval power; and from the port of Brest, by its situation on the Atlantic, a blow can be given to England before her fleet could get out of the Channel. But Cork possesses the same advantages over Brest, which Brest does over Plymouth, not to mention the many other fine harbours on our coast, whose names are hardly known out of Ireland.

Perhaps the importance of Ireland to the sister kingdom will never be felt, unless it falls into the hands of an enemy. Should that ever be the case, the possession of it would empower that enemy, from its south western and northern points, effectually to cripple the naval and commercial exertions of England, and in consequence, reduce her to as insignificant a state, as the island of Sardinia, in the scale of European powers. In fact, if a great naval power ever cultivates the advantages of Ireland to the utmost, that will alone insure her dictating to all the rest of Europe on the ocean.

* Those restrictions were of no benefit to England, tho' ruinous to Ireland. One or two trading towns, indeed, derived some trifling advantage, but by no means such as to make it a national concern.

But

But we must likewise throw into the scale, the great supplies which this country affords to a naval power. Except the article of timber, she has, or may have, every other. In the article of provisions, the fertility of her soil and mildness of her climate, give her a decided advantage over any other country in the universe. Her ports are never frozen up, as is the case in the north of Europe and America; and she has none of those tedious and dangerous channel navigations, which all the other nations of Europe, France and Spain only excepted, are obliged to undergo.

Should Ireland by the misfortune of war fall into the power of any foreign country, the separation from England would be felt and deplored; their situations and mutual wants are such as no substitute could be found for. The linen trade which constitutes the wealth of half the kingdom, and coals, so essential to our manufactures, would be for ever lost to us; for hitherto there has been no reason to believe, the island contains any adequate supply within itself. The two most obvious articles, among those necessary to this country, are here specified. The detail might be much enlarged, but as it is not at all the object of this publication to consider any point not immediately connected with the military situation of the kingdom, no farther deduction shall be drawn from the foregoing premises, than, that a conquest of Ireland, and consequent separation from England, by a foreign enemy, would be the greatest misfortune that could befall this island.

The surface of Ireland presents a great tract of fertile land, in all its variations of pasture and tillage; but over this are interspersed great tracts

of mountain. The flat and fertile lands are interspersed with great tracts of bog, of which most are passable in some parts to infantry, but not to cavalry or to artillery; a difficulty which is however compensated, in the infinity of most excellent roads, running in all directions to and from the coast to the capital, as well as cross roads, intersecting them in every point. Lakes and chains of rapids, are another leading feature in the face of Ireland, and tho' the rivers are not large, yet as the banks are strong and afford good positions, or if not strong by elevation, are boggy, they are all of consequence in a military view. But the great object in the map of Ireland, is the Shannon. This great chain of lakes, cuts off an entire province from the rest of Ireland, and may be classed with the Elbe, and almost with the Rhine, whose banks furnish so many important events in the military history of Europe.

The northern parts, and south western point, are the most mountainous, the others the most fertile parts of the island; these last produce that redundance of provisions, which we export to other countries with so much profit to ourselves; and of course, it is from these only that an army, friendly or hostile, can expect to draw subsistence.

Ireland has no woods; its fuel in the interior parts is entirely turf, and therefore it is necessary that an army should be prepared to make use of that fuel, or so provide itself as not to stand in need of any, during the time of its absence from its magazines.

The coasts of Ireland are in general bold. All the western, north western, and south western parts have fine harbours, (those in the Channel
are

are not so good) the west and south westerly winds prevail on those coasts, and the tide rises every where to a considerable height. The coast counties are in general thinly peopled, producing considerable quantities of cattle, but not having many mills or stores, where any quantity of grain is laid up at a time, more than necessary for the actual residents from one year to another*. Therefore, if an enemy landed on those coasts, he would be obliged to subsist from the sea, until he was able to penetrate into the interior of the country. From the indentations of the coasts, they of course afford an enemy positions; these coasts are generally less inclosed than the interior of the country, the face of which is divided into squares of larger or smaller size, by mounds of earth, a defence against any arms but artillery, and which literally make every field a redoubt: and this description extends to all the cultivated part of the kingdom.

Its principal harbours are Cork, Bantry, Galway, and Lough Foyle, but the landing places are innumerable. These harbours have bold shores, but as the tide rises so high, there is always also a considerable extent of beach.

The inhabitants of Ireland consist of those resident in the great towns; tradesmen and manufacturers, who reside in dispersed cottages, in the parts of the island where the linen trade is carried on; and farmers and their labourers in the other parts†. The men of property, clergy and

* As there is a considerable export, there certainly are stores at the sea ports. This observation must therefore not be taken in a strict, but a relative or comparative sense.

† Of these, the people of the lower orders in the North are of a military turn, capable of being immediately formed into

and gentry, are much thinner dispersed thro' the country than in England; or, compared to the population, are in Scotland; and being at no pains to acquire it, are possessed of very little influence over the peasantry. The towns are, in general poor, of no natural strength, nor are there any fortified; those which had works around them were destroyed by Cromwell. The natural strength of Ireland consists in the face of the country, and the nature of the climate; it has no artificial strength, but what it possesses in the navy of England.

into excellent soldiers. Those of the rest of the kingdom are utterly devoid of military spirit, depressed by poverty, except when they are goaded to some act of desperation; but still capable of being made to fight in defence of their homes and families, to which they are strongly attached; a good militia might in time be formed of them,

C H A P. II.

On the Probability of an Attack by the French—In what Part they would most probably make it—On the Likelihood of Success or Failure—With what Force.

THE westerly and south westerly winds, which blow nine months in the year, are favorable to a fleet sailing from Brest to the western coast of Ireland, as those very winds which bring them here, detain the British fleet in the Channel, and are equally obstructive of any succour arriving in Ireland from Liverpool, Whitehaven, or even Milford Haven. It is extraordinary that the advantage of making a naval depot at Milford Haven, and stationing a force there, has not struck the British administration, as its capaciousness and situation give it advantages over any port on that coast, for getting out into the Atlantic, the Bay of Biscay, St. George's Channel, and the west and south west of Ireland.

Brest, taking it in a nautical point of view, is nearer Ireland by near one half than Plymouth; nor is there indeed any thing to be dreaded by this country, from any preparations in the French ports in the Channel, as any such must be designed with a view against some other point of the British dominions.

From the present state of affairs between England and France, it seems highly probable that the French will make an attack upon the British dominions in Europe. It is not probable that she will leave England, if she can help it, in a condition

dition at the peace to do her future injury; and it will always be the object of that country to crush England if she can. It is also probable that France may think, that as Ireland is the most vulnerable part of the British empire, so a blow there would be the most fatal to her. The system of carrying on war, which that nation has adopted, viz. of making attacks upon a number of points at the same time, would also be, in such a case, put in practice, and they would menace different parts of this coast, to distract our attention, at the same time that they could hold the troops on the south coast of England in check, by menacing that side, and the troops on the east and north from Holland. In so doing the grand fleet could hardly venture from the Channel. But if the main design of the enemy was against this country, their fleet would be at sea in the mouth of the Channel, to detain the British in port, or prevent their sending out detachments, or to give battle, in order to secure the debarkation on the south west, west or north of Ireland, while a squadron of frigates would station themselves in St. George's Channel, to intercept succours arriving from England.

It is probable that, for reasons which will be hereafter assigned, Galway would be considered by them as the most advantageous part to make a landing at, and that whatever other places they threatened would be only diversions.

These attacks must be either desultory and cursory, like those of Paul Jones, and the equally trivial, tho' more fatal ones, of ours on the coast of France; or they will be in great force for the purpose of conquest.

A great force would require such preparation, time, &c. as must make it known. To land fifty thousand

thousand men, would require at least two hundred sail of transports, a convoy of several sail of the line, twenty frigates, and as many vessels of shallow draft carrying heavy guns to cover the debarkation. This would altogether constitute a fleet of at least two hundred and fifty sail, (for so short a distance transports would convey many men) having on board forty thousand infantry, three thousand artillery, four thousand mounted and dismounted light cavalry and hussars, a corps of pontooners, engineers and marines, to serve in the gun boats, &c. making in all an army of fifty thousand men; and it is probable, for the reasons that will be hereafter assigned, that such an attempt would not be made with a smaller force. If they have such a fleet in the mouth of the Channel, as will hold the British in check *; or if they are determined to risque an action, or if the British fleet cannot quit its post in the Channel, by reason of the manœuvres of the French on the opposite coast; or finally, if the wind is adverse, in every one of these cases, it is not only possible, but highly probable, that an enemy, such as we have supposed, may arrive on our coast. It is likewise probable, that if the commanders took proper measures, it would

* Happily England has as yet a decided superiority at sea, a superiority she may maintain many years; but notwithstanding that, when the French fleet is in force, the British fleet cannot go out in detachments. It then becomes necessary to ascertain what force France has at sea, before Britain can send out hers, as the consequence of meeting a decidedly superior enemy might be fatal. So many accidents may intervene to cause delay in nautical affairs, that the blow may be struck before the British fleet can arrive to give battle to the enemy. If that is done, the enemy runs into port, but if they must give battle, what is the worst that can happen to them? the loss of eight or ten ships of the line, manned with such sailors as theirs, compared to the conquest of Ireland! Once the invading army is put on shore, the British fleet can no longer protect; a descent may be effected without a superiority at sea, and that by a much more probable concurrence of fortuitous circumstances, than that which enabled the French to penetrate into Holland.

not

not be possible to prevent their effecting a landing. Small forces never, and great ones seldom, have been prevented from doing so. A fleet of two hundred and fifty sail, collected at Brest, l'Orient, Rochefort, &c. would certainly be attended with many delays and accidents, and require much combination, so that more is left to hazard in its success. And as it must be known, its destination may be nearly ascertained, and in consequence, the more precautions taken; not forgetting, however, that even if the design of an invasion of Ireland were public, still the exigencies of England might be so imperious as to preclude her from the possibility of detaching her grand fleet, in which case we must save ourselves by our own exertions only.

But unfortunately our coasts are not in a state of defence, nor can they be put in one at the moment of danger; and so many parts would be threatened, as to render it impossible to venture to concentrate the force for the defence of the island in any one point; or if it were, probably it would be the wrong one; and to add to this, false attacks often, being neglected, become the true ones, as soon as it appears that they have a chance of succeeding.

It therefore follows, that were an attack on the coast of Ireland made, on the part of the French, such an attack would so far succeed, as that the disembarkation might be effected; and there is also reason to think, that of the many parts of the island where landing in great force is possible, Galway is the most practicable, because the navigation is most favorable, as also, that the enemy could keep us longer in suspense as to his real point of attack; besides the peculiar advantages that bay offers, the excellent posts its shores afford, and the facility with which an advance into, and conquest of, first the province of Connaught, and subsequently of the whole kingdom, might be effected.

C H A P.

C H A P. III.

Of the Form of Debarkation—and where it is, or is not to be, apprehended.

IF a fleet, having arrived on our coast, intends to effect an absolute conquest of the country, what becomes of the shipping which brought that force here, is a matter of little consequence to the enemy; its business is to land the troops and stores, and not at all to re-embark them. As the object is the complete conquest of the island, and that cannot be effected until the capital is got possession of, therefore they will of course endeavor to disembark within as few days march of the capital as possible, adhering to that essential rule in the military art, viz. *to make the line of operations as short as possible*. As this expression may not be intelligible, except to military men, the following definition comprehends and explains its meaning, in as few words as it can well be put.

The line of operation of an army, is one drawn between the point against which it is destined, and that from whence it draws its subsistence; and this is the great and main groundwork of all plans of military movements, campaigns, &c.

But the nearest part of the coast, where a landing can be effected, to Dublin, is Galway. If a hostile fleet, having on board a force such as we have stated, arrives in Galway harbour, no force that could be sent against it, could prevent its landing and occupying the town, and if necessary,
a position

position from the sea and their fleet on the right, to Lough Corrib on their left; there they could maintain themselves, intrench their camp, secure their flanks, or indeed, if necessary, secure a retreat*.

Their frigates would probably make a diversion in their favor, by threatening other parts of the coast. But the march by Bantry is longer, and thro' a difficult country, as it is also from Cork, and still more so by Lough Foyle. The shortest and most eligible line of operation is by Galway, as in two days march they are at the Shannon; by getting possession of which, they have all the province of Connaught secured to them, and in four days march they can be in possession of Dublin.

But in case of a landing at Bantry Bay†, the enemy would probably advance in two columns, one against Cork‖, the other against Limerick, where the country is strong by nature, and the direct roads few, a situation which would expose them to considerable danger, if they had an officer opposite them, capable of taking advantage of it.

From these cities, an army endeavouring to gain Dublin, and the east coast, for the double purpose of displacing the government, and making the coast their frontier against England, might march in two or more columns, as will be hereafter shewn.

* It is evident that several positions might be chosen there, where it would be impossible to turn their flanks or rear.

† Which, as it is possible, deserves consideration, more especially also, as a co-operating force might be landed there by the enemy with very good effect, to cause a diversion in favor of their grand attack in some other part.

‖ Which they would seize.

The country thro' which these armies would pass, admits very well of a defensive war, and like most of Ireland might be disputed, therefore, should the enemy make a landing in this country, it were to be wished they should attempt it in that part; but as we cannot hope much complaisance from them, it is a duty we owe ourselves, immediately to endeavor to secure those parts which are vulnerable.

Troops would disembark under cover of the artillery of their vessels, if there was an army guarding the coast. If the opposition which they expected was trifling, they would probably come in with the tide to the shore; but if the troops appeared in force on the shore, and that it was also covered with works and cannon, they would then disembark and form upon the beach, and advance against the coast in force. It is for this reason, high strong tides and extensive strands, are favourable to the operations of the enemy. If about 1800 yards is the range of a cannon shot, they would march so far under cover of the guns of their fleet, to attack the force which would probably be formed on the coast; but if this coast were defended with works, they would probably endeavor to take them in flank*. Having gotten possession of heights upon the coast, they would there throw up entrenchments, and proceed to land their stores.

* For on such a one as is here described, an army disembarking at low water could not possibly be attacked in their disembarkation; and when in force, if the whole coast is not fortified and defended, it might as well not be so in any part, as they can advance in whatever direction they judge best.

C H A P. IV.

Of the best Methods of opposing a Disembarkation.

MAIZEROY enters largely into the defence of a coast against incursions, but avoids saying any thing relative to an invasion in force, as such an occurrence had not, like the other, come under his notice. Probably he did not choose to incur the risque of reasoning on what he had never seen; it is much easier certainly to write satisfactorily upon the one than upon the other.

Wherever a landing is to be apprehended, the whole of that coast ought to be well reconnoitred, and the water sounded, and the positions for opposing the enemy chosen. The previous arrangements having been made, on his appearance on the coast, the troops destined for the defence of it should immediately assemble at the appointed rendezvous.

If batteries, and the other works, have not been thrown up, they ought to be so. The enemy will land upon as level a shore as they can, under cover of their vessels; the fire from their vessels would probably be very great, suppose four hundred guns; it is therefore the object of the troops who defend, to close upon the enemy immediately on their landing, as from that time their artillery, in which they will till then to a certainty be superior, will be useless. Should they be driven back to their boats, the batteries must again open upon and endeavour to sink them. Though troops disembarking in a bay, where there are several landing places, possess an advantage over the defending army, inasmuch as
 acting

acting on a smaller segment, they can mask their real intention by feints, till it is too late to prevent them, and they act *from* a centre, whereas their opponents act *to* one, which is an advantage. If the enemy intrenches himself, and that the troops do not arrive in time to prevent that, yet before he advances, the intrenchments ought to be immediately stormed, and an attack by cannon upon the fleet from the heights at the same time, to distract their attention, and prevent their sending succours. If once driven from their intrenchments, their destruction ought to be the consequence.

Yet two Tuscan frigates at Algiers, by an enfilading fire, contrived to save the Spanish army; the retreat was covered by the grenadiers commanded by Col. O'Brien; only one shot was fired by them during the retreat, tho' the Algerine cavalry came up almost to their bayonets. The failure of that expedition was owing to the grossest mismanagement and ignorance.

The Algerines did not even appear on the coast. Instead of the first line, when landing, taking its position and intrenching itself, they did not wait for the disembarkation of the second line, and were defeated before that joined them. Against such a place as Algiers, even had they gained an advantage in landing, nothing of consequence could have been effected. It was an absurd scheme, ignorantly executed. In a landing, not less than ten thousand should disembark at a time; they should advance in as many columns as possible, and occupy the first heights, from which they should on no account whatever advance a step, but intrench themselves there.

The misconduct of those who commanded our expeditions on the coast of France, in Lord Chatham's

Chatham's time, was such, that it is said they once encamped with their front to the sea and their rear to the enemy, probably "*par signe de mepris.*"

Such incursions answer no end, but the destruction of those engaged in them, as at St. Cas, unless there is well-grounded hope that the people of the country would be on the side of the invader.

If the defending army can make no impression on the enemy, its artillery and baggage, &c. must be sent up the country; and it must divide itself for the purpose of observing the motions of the enemy, and taking positions to obstruct his march to the capital, until more or sufficient force assemble.

CHAP. V.

*Campaigns of Schomberg—William III.—and Ginkle,
in Ireland.*

WILLIAM having driven James from England, this island became the theatre of the war, which was conducted with considerable talents on both sides, and had not it been for the pusillanimity of James, it might have taken a very different turn from what it did; but the mere presence of that weak and headstrong Monarch, was sufficient to blast his fortune, and his friends' hopes.

Schomberg landed at the head of twelve thousand men, in August 1689, without meeting any opposition, in Carrickfergus Bay. With the assistance of six ships of war, he took possession of that town, and on his advancing into the country, the positions taken by the hostile armies were as follow: Schomberg occupied a position at Dundalk, which he found himself obliged to fortify. Rosen threatened his right flank, and James, with about thirty thousand men, was posted on the Boyne at Drogheda. Thus James had Schomberg there in a *cul-de-sac*, his retreat cut off, his army wasting by sickness, shut up in intrenchments, and James himself with a superior army in their front. He made a feeble and characteristic attempt to vanquish Schomberg by treachery, and even then, when nothing more was wanting to the destruction of his enemy's army, but James' giving the word to attack, his
C resolution

resolution failed, and he retired to his former position, letting Schomberg escape, and retreat unmolested.

June 1690, William landed with 36,000 men, and marched along the eastern coast toward the capital, drawing his supplies from his fleet. James's army, consisting of 30,000 men, lay in their position as before described, at Drogheda, and he was now obliged, contrary to his inclination, to venture an action. James's position was well chosen; his right appuyé on Drogheda, which he occupied, his front to the Boyne, fordable, but deep, with strong banks, which were intersected by mounds of earth, hedges and ditches, his army presented a front of about three miles, extending towards Slane, where was a bridge, which he neglected to occupy; the river toward the centre of James's position forms a considerable projecting bend, and another in reverse higher up toward Slane. This is important, as the fate of the battle was in a great degree decided by its locality, the effect of which, on the manœuvres of the two armies, was strongly marked in the course of the day; for it is to be observed, both parties had neglected to occupy the pass of Slane. William advanced in three columns to the opposite banks of the river, reconnoitred and adjusted his plan of operation, determining to attack by the right and centre. Accordingly, in the morning, he detached a corps to pass by Slane; this corps arrived sooner at its destination than that sent by James (who saw his error too late) to anticipate it, which by the curve of the river was forced to make a considerable detour, whereby time, as we have stated, was given to William's detachment to arrive and seize the pass before them; having crossed which, and formed, they advanced

vanced on the left of James's army, and extending to the right, turned it, notwithstanding a morass in its front, by which manœuvre it was compelled to fall back in confusion toward Duleek. William had so combined his attacks, that his centre was to pass at the time his right should have completely engaged the left of James's army. When that, therefore, was seen to have taken place, his centre column advanced against Old-Bridge, and his left to the fords, which having passed, and gained the opposite bank at the projecting curve of the Boyne, they there formed, and received an attack from the right and centre of James, which they repulsed, and advanced. The Irish army fell back above two miles, to Donore, where they formed, and advanced again to the charge; but William's cavalry having, according to their orders, completely turned their left, the fortune of the day could not be recovered, and they were forced to fall back, pursued with loss, to Duleek, behind which they again rallied.

This is one of the most interesting actions recorded in history. James's position was well chosen; his great and glaring misconduct was in not occupying the pass of Slane with a strong corps of infantry and artillery, covered by works. This was the key to his post, and had it been properly guarded, William could not have forced his position; but when he had turned James's left, it enabled him, after his centre had crossed the Old-Bridge, to deploy it; for James's centre was obliged to fall back, seeing the enemy's cavalry on their flank ||. The cavalry was not

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then

|| No success gained by James's right and centre, could alter the events of that day. Had they even thrown their opponents back into the river, still William's advancing on their

then what it is now, but that of both armies were much on a par. Tho' the country was unfavourable for that army, yet they decided the day, both here and at Aughrim. Had Slane been occupied, William must have gone higher up the Boyne in order to have passed. It appears a great neglect on the part of William, not to have intercepted the Irish army at Duleek. They must have surrendered or been driven into the sea. Probably he did not wish to be embarrassed with James as a prisoner, following the proverb adopted from the Spaniards, "*A l'ennemi qui se retire un pont d'or.*" (The French do not seem to have followed that maxim this war, except in the instance of the Duke of Brunswick.) James was glad to have an excuse for flying to Versailles. From this time James's army acted without a plan; but they were reduced to desperation. The resource they adopted of retiring behind the Shannon was a good one; William's followed them in a disorderly manner. Grace who commanded in Athlone, had occupied the town west of the Shannon, with four thousand men, supported by another corps in the neighbourhood. Douglas attempted to reduce it with a battery of six guns; this not succeeding to his wishes, he retreated with disgrace.

their flank, which was uncovered, could not be remedied. The attack by Slane was the grand *manceuvre*. The attacks of the centre and left were only secondary ones. In this action the great system was displayed; the right attacking, the left refusing itself. Two detachments sent to seize a pass, the intermediate ground favors one more than the other. It arrives in time to form and drive in its opponent. Had James seized the pass, he could have turned William's right, while in the act of fording the river, had he ventured to do it.

Mean

Mean time, William laid siege to Limerick, where Sarsfield performed a gallant action with a corps of cavalry. He made a detour, crossed the Shannon at Killaloe, came in the rear of William's army within about seven miles, and intercepted and destroyed a convoy of artillery, who thought themselves in perfect safety so near their own camp. Limerick made a gallant defence, and William was forced to retreat. Sept. 29th, the Duke of Marlborough landed at Cork with five thousand men. Having increased it to about ten thousand, he took Cork and Kinsale.

Previous to the campaign of 1691, the Irish and their French allies possessed all the country west of the Shannon, with the important garrisons of Limerick and Athlone, and were entire masters of the whole of the Shannon. Ginkle having withdrawn into winter cantonments, was obliged to confine himself solely to the protection of the English frontier, as it was called, which was continually and vexatiously harassed by incursions from the opposite side of the Shannon. To add to its misfortunes, bodies of undisciplined and insubordinate armed men, taking the advantage of the unhappy times, plundered and murdered on all sides, under the names of Volunteers and Rapparees, so called from the species of weapon which they were armed with, a kind of spear or pike, the first that occurs and easiest supplied. These wretches having been already robbed, first by James's, and if they escaped them, by William's army, deprived thereby of the means of subsistence, were forced to take to a life of robbery, and wandered under these names in gangs; the men armed, and followed by their wives and families, whom they easily trained to the business.

The

James's army, elated at having forced William to retreat, and indeed with reason, as it was nearly equivalent to depriving him of all the fruits of his victory; for, in reality, he gained nothing by it but Dublin, and a desolated country, to harass their enemy, and also with more sanguine views, projected an attack on Mullingar, and to further it, occupied and fortified the town of Ballimore, which is situated half way between Mullingar and Athlone; but Ginkle, thinking it necessary to prevent their establishing themselves at Mullingar, advanced against them and drove them from it, (it has been asserted the Irish pointed their pallisades the wrong way.) Ginkle pursued them to Grenogue, where they attempted a stand in front of the town, but were driven thro' it, and pursued to the very walls of Athlone. The whole of this conduct on the part of the Irish was erroneous, as they ought solely to have occupied themselves in strengthening their frontier behind the Shannon, augmenting the fortifications of Athlone and Limerick, and beating up Ginkle's quarters, whose army, dispirited and unhealthy, in bad winter quarters, would have melted away before the campaign began.

In spring, St. Ruth, a French general, sent over by that court, took the command, contrary to the feelings of the gallant Sarsfield, who deserved better treatment. St. Ruth was a man of abilities; like his countrymen, ardent, vehement, and attached to his own opinions, with a sovereign contempt of the persons and talents of those with whom he was to act, who were not of his nation. He brought some French officers with him, who came fraught with the same contempt of the natives, by whom they were universally

versally hated. It is probable they did more harm to that cause than good; disunion and jealousy immediately shewed themselves. Tho' the French court sent officers, they did not send either money, or any other requisite; but James's army, tho' thus abandoned by their allies, did not despair, but were, on the contrary, much elated by their late successes. St. Ruth soon decided on his plan of operations, which was, to occupy the frontier presented by the river Shannon, by taking his position in a central point near Athlone. A great oversight was committed by St. Ruth, in not withdrawing their force from Ballymore, a place at that time of no consequence to them; but they suffered Ginkle, on his advance, to take a thousand of his best troops, then in garrison there, prisoners; a circumstance attended with peculiar bad consequence at the opening of the campaign, as it railed the spirits of the other army, and damped those of their own.

Ginkle advanced toward Athlone, and reconnoitring the army of St. Ruth, found it posted on a neck of land between two bogs, about two miles beyond the Shannon. He carried the part of the town of Athlone, on the east side of the river, without difficulty. St. Ruth's army retired to the other, breaking down the bridges. Ginkle saw the danger and difficulty that was likely to attend the attempt to pass the river, under the guns of a fortress, and in front of a formidable enemy. He therefore formed a plan for that purpose, by stealing a march, and throwing a bridge of boats over it above Lough Ree, at Lanesboro', but by his enemy's vigilance, the scheme was discovered and foiled.

He then determined to force his passage in the place he occupied, and after some attempts succeeded

ceeded in repairing the bridge which St. Ruth's army in their retreat had broke down. Having done which, he ordered his right column to attack by the bridge, and the left and centre to ford the river. St. Ruth, however, burnt the bridge, and Ginkle was obliged to countermand the attack; and saw himself reduced to the desperate necessity of retreating to Dublin, thro' a desolated country, exposed to the harrassing of an exulting enemy. It is not often that a council of war gives its opinion for battle; the foreseeing and starting difficulties, is the assertion of superior wisdom; yet it happened that Ginkle's council did adopt the boldest, and as it generally is the wisest measure, for a failure in it could not put them in a worse situation than they were. This was, for the immediate attack. Two thousand men, divided into three columns, advanced to storm the town, which was defended by about an equal number. Some resistance was made; but the gallantry of the centre column, who passed the ford under a most heavy fire, and entered the town, driving the enemy before them, enabled the other two columns to establish themselves also, within the walls. St. Ruth committed an unpardonable error, in his neglect of this post, as the event shewed.

St. Ruth was obliged, by this success, to change his position, in order to cover and keep his communication open with Limerick. He therefore retreated down the course of the Shannon, and took a position behind the river Suck; his right toward the Shannon, occupying the heights called Kilcommedin Hill, upon a front of two miles; his left, secured by a rivulet and a bog, which also covered his front, as far as a pass on a chain of small hills, which lay opposite his right. Here
he

he determined to wait the attack of the British.

St. Ruth's army consisted of about twenty-four thousand men, William's of about eighteen thousand. Ginkle having called in all his detachments, on the 12th of July, 1692, attacked with his left; the cavalry marched by the pass before-mentioned and deployed, covering the left flank of his infantry, as they advanced upon the enemy, who retired gradually from ditch to ditch before them. As the infantry advanced in this difficult ground, where their cavalry could not protect them, they began to find themselves enfiladed, and flanked from behind the hedges on their left; for gaps having been cut, at proper intervals, in the banks and ditches, the enemy had by that means got upon their flank. This gave them a check. St. Ruth, wishing to follow up his blow there, and seeing nothing to apprehend upon his left, drew away his cavalry from thence, in the intention of bringing it upon the left of Ginkle. There was a narrow pass by the castle of Aughrim, in front of St. Ruth's left. Ginkle ordered his right wing to attack St. Ruth's left, which was now exposed, and to defile by this pass, and form on the other side; the right of his infantry advancing thro' the bog, so as to form on the opposite side, by the time the cavalry of the right had formed its line. Talmaish, who commanded it, executed the manœuvre with ability, and led his corps in a column between the castle and the bog, formed on the other side, and advanced just in time to save the centre of the British line of infantry, which having waded thro' the bog, had attacked and driven the Irish line before them; but falling into confusion in advancing, the Irish had rallied, and charging them in turn, had

had driven them back with great loss, into the bog. Just at this critical instant, Ginkle's cavalry, shewing themselves, checked St. Ruth's line, and gave time to his infantry, (who had gone beyond their orders, which were, not to advance upon the enemy, until they saw their right wing of cavalry entirely passed the castle,) to rally under the ditches at the bog's edge, and being re-formed, to advance in good order, with the cavalry upon their right, upon the left of the enemy. St. Ruth, to whom the appearance of Ginkle's right wing of cavalry, so near his line, was a surprise, not expecting to have had both his flanks attacked, was bringing up a reserve of cavalry, for the purpose of falling on Ginkle's right, when he was killed by a cannon shot.

This fortunate shot probably caused the gaining the battle. St. Ruth had the advantage upon the right, where the first attack had been made. Ginkle's infantry were exhausted, by wading thro' a bog up to their middles; they had been driven back into that bog with loss and confusion, and St. Ruth was at that moment coming down upon their right flank, with a fresh body of cavalry. So far every thing was in his favor.

But St. Ruth communicated with no one; by this conduct he lost Athlone. To Sarsfield, his second in command, he had a particular pique. His whole arrangements were confined to his own head; and Sarsfield, who succeeded to the command, was in utter ignorance of what was going on about him, except of that which immediately concerned his own post: Of course, on the fall of St. Ruth, every thing was at a stop, the officers waiting for orders, and no one to give them. In consequence, his army first retreated, pressed by Ginkle, and then fled. The

The infantry, in their usual custom, to a bog *, the cavalry to Loughrea. Thus ended the battle of Aughrim, and with it the hopes of those who had attached themselves to James.

Ginkle's position, previous to the attack, was on the Suck, near Ballinasloe, opposite St. Ruth's. St. Ruth's main errors, every one of which was sufficient to have caused the loss of the battle, were, First, not communicating with Sarsfield: Secondly, not fortifying the pass on his right, which would have prevented Ginkle's cavalry from passing there, and of course, the necessity of his unfurnishing his left: Thirdly, not attacking the right wing of Talmash, while in the act of deploying, after passing by the castle of Aughrim, a manœuvre, that by the foregoing account, must have taken up a considerable time.

Had the British army been defeated, St. Ruth, by crossing the Shannon, might have taken a position on their rear, and destroyed their whole army. His position was chosen with great skill, and his army seem to have maintained their ground with great firmness. On the other hand, the manœuvres of William's army were conducted in a manner that evinced much talents on the part of the generals. It is an extraordinary circumstance, that in such ground, the event of the action at Aughrim, (as well as at Drogheda) should have been turned by the cavalry.

St. Ruth was every where himself during the action, but always a little too late. He was one of those men who never think any thing

* A letter, giving an account of the battle of Kilrush, where Lord Mountgarret's army was defeated by the Earl of Ormond, says, that the adjacent bog was black, (the colour of their cloathing) with the multitude who fled to it, out of reach of the cavalry.

properly done, except what they do themselves. The army's retiring to Loughbrea, after the defeat, was merely accidental. Had Sarsfield's army retired to Galway, they might probably have done better there than at Limerick. Probably they would have compelled Ginkle to divide his force. At any rate, either Galway or Limerick must have been in his rear. Had Ginkle left him there, he would have lost Connaught again ; and had he besieged him there, the garrison of Limerick might have made a diversion in his favour ; besides, Sarsfield's army was still numerous. St. Ruth took one precaution, which never ought to be omitted in similar circumstances. Ditches and banks become an inconvenience to an army, if they cramp its manœuvres. Whenever the situation is such, debouchures should be cut in them, in those places where they are best protected by cross fire. They should be sufficiently large for troops to pass on a considerable front, and might be closed against cavalry by *chevaux de frize*.

If Sarsfield had retreated to Galway, Ginkle could not have left him behind. The campaign was then far advanced, and would still have had Limerick to reduce ; and an advanced season in the field is always fatal to foreigners in this country.

Ginkle marched by the Munster side of the Shannon, and occupied the ground before Limerick, which the King had done the year before, on the side of Ireton's Fort. He now secured all the passes on the Shannon, the necessity of which he had been taught the last campaign. Perceiving he could not hope to take the place, without completely investing it, he passed in the night above the town, by an island, to a part of the river

river which is fordable, and which he gained by the connivance of the officer appointed to guard it, with a corps of dragoons, as was the custom of that time; for they had usually a great and over-proportion of cavalry, to their infantry, and were, consequently, obliged often to employ the cavalry, upon services to which they were not adapted. As for instance, leaving the entire guard of a ford to them, if attacked, they cannot maintain their post. A good detachment of infantry, with some works mounted with guns, are the proper defence of a ford, as well as of a bridge.

Ginkle having completely invested, blockaded the town to the 22d September. It is extraordinary, during this time, no attempt was made to destroy the bridge of communication, and attack the forces on one side of the river, when separated; but in general, an army which is discouraged by a series of ill success, *Ne s'occupe* (as the King of Prussia said of his officers) *qu'à parer les bottes que leur font les autres*; observing at the same time, *Mais je mettrai bientôt ordre à cela*, which he did, and turned the tide in his favor. On the 22d, Ginkle stormed the works of Thomond bridge. On the 23d, the garrison beat a parley, and by the surrender of this city, the conquest of the kingdom was completed.

These three campaigns in Ireland, are the only part of its military history, which are in any way interesting. At that time the grand principles of war were understood; and altho' the improvement of tactics, of which Prussia set the example, by introducing the true principles of the Greeks, has within the last fifty years, by its refinements and multiplied combinations, completely set aside the old system of warfare, yet the great principles

ples must ever remain, in the same manner as architecture may derive benefit from the improvements of handicraft, tho' the sublime principles of Euclid, on which its rules are founded, must ever remain invariable.

In these campaigns, ability was shewn on both sides. William was a military monarch, commanding a veteran army. James was the very reverse, commanding, or (to speak more properly) at the head of undisciplined forces, divided by different interests and views, while the faction and animosity of individuals tore them to pieces. The French affected and felt a contempt, which they did not seek to disguise, for the Irish, and the Irish retaliated in hatred to their haughty auxiliaries. Indeed, the Irish seem to have acted better from the time the French troops withdrew.

A few observations upon the general conduct of the campaign, may not be impertinent, as they will tend to throw into one view, a series of military events, highly interesting to the Irish nation at the present day, when a formidable enemy is at their very doors, and when there is reason to apprehend, that if not this, the next ensuing campaign, may bring the theatre of the war into our island.

Schomberg landed at Carrickfergus, (as Thurot afterwards did) without opposition, in the year 1689, with about ten thousand men. Having augmented his army, he advanced to Dundalk; while James lay in an apathy, with treble his force, at Drogheda.

Why James's generals did not take a position at Newry, is unaccountable; there they might have destroyed the British army. Again at Dundalk, they had them, as it were, in a net.

Yet

Yet even the hopes of treachery, could not induce James to make a real attack upon Schomberg. If he had done it, his correspondence with certain parts of that army, would have been attended, probably, with good effect to him; but he did not get near enough to the conspiracy, to be able to make it explode; as if there was any hope of success in war, without incurring some danger.

In the campaign of 1690, Schomberg was superseded by William himself, who commanded a fine army of 30,000 men, well appointed and inured to service, and who had, in addition to those advantages, the highest confidence in their commander. James still occupied his position near Drogheda.

William, with his superior force, was right to come to an action. His opponent's position was well chosen, but the locality was not taken sufficient advantage of. The salient curve of the Boyne was not fortified; Slane was not occupied. William might have been forced to have looked for a passage higher up the Boyne; but tho' he would have effected it, yet delay was injurious to him, whose presence was called for in other places, and might have been beneficial to James.

William could have finished the campaign in Ireland, after his victory at the Boyne, by seizing the pass of Duleek*. Probably, had he done so,

* Some generals seem to think, the only consequence to be drawn from a victory, is, to sing Te Deum. The late Marshal Daun was remarkable for his fondness for this church music. Sooner than omit it, he suffered the whole Prussian army to escape, after their defeat at Kollin. Laudohn, then a Lieut. Col. of Croats, being youngest in the council of war, gave his opinion for immediately pushing on a corps to seize a pass, which, if pre-occupied, no Prussian

so, he would not have been able to avoid taking James prisoner, and he did not wish to be embarrassed with him. It may be so inferred, from the little trouble he took to follow him.

After the defeat at the Boyne, the Irish army retired behind the Shannon. This was well judged. Limerick was so well defended, William was obliged to raise the siege. Next year Ginkle took it, for which he was indebted to the desperate situation of James's affairs, and, in consequence thereof, the distracted state of the garrison. Athlone was taken in a gallant manner, owing to the infatuation of St. Ruth. Still a victory was necessary to give William a decided superiority, and Ginkle was obliged to hazard a battle at Aughrim, where the situation of the British was such, that a defeat would to them have been utter ruin.

James's army made good use of the ditches and inclosures, in their positions; but the bayonet was not so well understood then as it is now; and wherever troops are so posted, they should be attacked with that arm. Most attacks upon intrenchments have succeeded, and the reason is obvious: an army is generally distributed thro' the extent of an intrenchment, and is equally weak every where. The assailants, on the contrary, concentrate their force upon certain points, which are carried before the other party can throw in a sufficient force to counterpoize them,
and

sian could ever have reached their own country. Had the advice of a Croat been followed on that day, his present Majesty of Prussia would not, probably, have been enabled to play so important a part, on the political theatre of Europe, as has lately fallen to him. His glorious predecessor's course was near terminated. The Austrians of that time used to affect to call him, fastidiously, *Le petit Marquis de Brandenburg*.

and once the intrenchments are entered, the flank and rear of the army is exposed; nor can they make a change of position as they could in the open field, but are tied down to one plan of operation. The only possible way of guarding against these inconveniencies, is by having great reserves, but then you must contract your intrenchments, and if the flanks are not secured by the natural position, that is hard to be done, without falling into other difficulties.

The feelings of the human mind also operate. The man who stands behind the breast-work, contemplates his enemy advancing. He apprehends, that if he once enters the intrenchment, there is no chance of his safety, but by flight. He has time to make all these kind of natural reflections. The assailant, on the contrary, kept in motion, is animated; he looks on his arrival in the works, as the period of his danger; he therefore rushes on, and generally succeeds. The French have, this war, made a gallant defence of intrenchments; but they have the advantages of artillery science and discipline, united with incredible numbers and enthusiasm; a rare combination! In general, a chain of strong redoubts and fleches, are preferable to lines. It is more difficult to run away from them. That a fewer number can thus defend an equal extent of ground, they must be so near as to support each other mutually. Another advantage which attends them is, that they leave the ground open for the army to manœuvre, as occasion requires. They can advance to take an advantage of any confusion into which the enemy may be thrown; and if requisite, retire behind the redoubts again; all which, lines will not permit.

It was well judged of Ginkle, after passing the bog in the front of the enemy, at Aughrim, to order the infantry to form under the first enclosures or ditches; but the Irish committed an oversight, in leaving any such between them and the bog unoccupied; as they should have levelled all such, had they time enough. St. Ruth does not seem to have taken much pains to strengthen his position. He lost the battle of Aughrim by the same failing which had before lost him Athlone; a pertinacious confidence in his own opinion, and contempt for the judgment of others.

C H A P. VI.

*On an armed Yeomanry—Cavalry—And Free Corps
of Infantry.*

IT were much to be wished, that the plan of arming the yeomanry, and forming them into corps of cavalry, had been adopted; but it ought to be with much precaution. The principal precaution should be, not to have too many corps, and to pay great attention to having them in good hands. They should not be composed of too great a number of privates; as for instance, the residence of every yeoman should be within seven miles of the place of rendezvous, in the centre of the whole; nor should their number be too small, as to every corps there ought to be five officers, resident gentlemen of influence and property. In case of the death or resignation of the captain, the next officer in command should invariably succeed him. People like those of whom such corps ought to be composed, would be disgusted and quit, were they to be turned over from one commandant to another, with as little ceremony as regulars; and the man who has most interest at court, has not always most interest in the country, *however high he may represent his own consequence there.*

There is not a county in Ireland, which could not make up two such corps of one hundred yeomen each. Some could make up five hundred; but reckoning one with another, at three hun-

dred to each county, it would make up a body of nine thousand six hundred cavalry, maintained without expence to government, ready to take the field at a day's notice, and fit for any service cavalry could be employed in.

Great care must be taken in giving the command of these corps. If they were given to any but men of liberal principles, it would do more harm than good ; a spirit of party would govern in the selection of the corps ; this baneful spirit is the destruction of all security in Ireland. All feasting, electioneering, and dissipation, should also be avoided. The less they become either soldiers or gentlemen, the better. The pride and glory of England is its yeomanry ; it was always so since the emancipation of the lower orders from villanage. In Ireland, one or two counties excepted, there has hardly hitherto been any such, till within this century, but they are now increasing, considering them as a body. In Wicklow and Wexford there is a yeomanry that would not disgrace any shire in England.

What makes a yeoman respectable, is the honest pride of conscious independence. The sense of his happy situation attaches him to his native soil, and the constitution of his country ; consequently, the yeomen of England have always been found the most difficult to be seduced by the spirit of innovation. An observer of the Irish nation, will not perceive much of the foregoing character here ; but it depends upon the gentlemen (not the little *soi disant* gentleman, the greatest tyrant and enemy the poor man has, but) the gentlemen of landed property, to create them ; it is only giving them a valuable interest in their small farms. When such a thing is so easily done, one would think that the example of

of the world, and the present times, ought to make them set about it in earnest. Mr. Arthur Young, in his tour thro' Ireland, saw, and has pointedly and truly detailed the grievance, and the real cause of it; and supplies some excellent hints to the gentlemen of Ireland. The poor man pays the taxes and tithes, his penury supports the splendor of the great, and ultimately he is the man to whom the defence of the country must be intrusted; for it is evident that nothing but imminent danger can arouse the rich, and that does not appear to be a * strong inducement to them to take arms in their hands; or if they were willing to fight for their properties, the number is too small to do it with any effect. For their own safety they ought then to put betimes those arms in the hands of a class of men, in whom they can confide, and not trust their all to the honor and self-denial of the outcasts of mankind, of men, whose situation any change whatsoever must better, and who know it. The best defence any country can have, is a happy, patriotic, and uncorrupted yeomanry. A national debt, and the concomitant evil of revenue laws, have not improved the morals of the people of England and Ireland, but are, on the contrary, it is to be feared, daily sapping the vitals and the strength of the empire †.

* They called *la rue ducale*, at Brussels, in the time of Dumourier's incursion, *la rue des lieures*.

† The excise is fattened with the rich result
Of all this riot; and ten thousand casks,
For ever dribbling out their base contents,
Touch'd by the Midas finger of the state,
Bleed gold for ministers to sport away.

COWPER.

The

The establishment of these corps of yeomanry cavalry, should be as follows: To be commanded by five gentlemen of property; one captain, two lieutenants, and two sub-lieutenants, and to consist of one hundred rank and file, composed of gentlemen, persons of independent income, or in trade; farmers and their sons, or near relatives, altho' not actually in possession of farms; each master of a horse. The arms, appointments, saddles and bridles to be supplied by government; the clothes by themselves. Their clothing should consist of a round hat with a narrow brim; a frize coat, buttoning down to the waist, and waistcoat; a frize loose coat, carried on the pommel of the saddle; leather breeches; boots coming well up to the knees; a pair of strong ticken overhose, coming half way down the leg; a straight one-edged sword, three feet from the pommel to the point, which must be sharp, in an iron scabbard*, like that of the Austrian cavalry, hanging in a waist-belt; one long pistol in the left holster, and four pistol cartridges in a magazine with the holster; in the other holster two horse shoes and two sets of nails; a haversack with a stiff leather bottom, to use as a nose bag, should be all their baggage.

These corps should assemble on Sundays after service, and on holidays, to practise moving in squadron, charging, breaking into file, and forming squadron from that to right and left, front and rear. They should also practise the sword, &c. the manner of posting videttes, patrolling a country, escorting a convoy, repeating signals, breaking, dispersing and forming, and also learn how to cross an enclosed country.

* Wooden scabbards break, and leather one's shrink and become useless.


When



This Plate Represents a Yeoman, Mounted.



an, Mounted and fully Appointed.



When an enemy is even in the country, these corps ought not to be called into the field. When embodied, there would be full use for them in their respective counties, by employing them, guarding magazines, convoys, assisting the quarter-masters and officers of stores in providing forage and provisions, and in maintaining internal peace. They should do orderly duty, if in the field, and be also cantoned about the army, but not commanded but by their own officers. They would probably in general act in small corps of twenty-five each, commanded by a lieutenant. While these corps remain in their counties, an officer resident in the county for the purpose, and appointed by government, should make quarterly inspections of the troops, drawing the whole together for one day; this would give them a spirit of emulation; and he should report the strength and state of each troop, and the condition of their arms and appointments, for which each captain should be answerable. When employed, they should receive a high pay, 2s. 6d. a day, and draw rations for themselves and horses. Such a corps would be intimately acquainted with the passes, roads, &c. of their respective counties, and would be invaluable sources of information for the generals.

They could detect any treachery on the part of the country people, over whom, on account of the class from which they are drawn, they would have a much greater influence than any troops, solely military, could have. The pay seems high, but it must be made worth their while to quit their homes and occupations; besides, they could not in their way live as cheap, by forming messes, &c. as the military do. The evolutions of such a corps ought, as above stated,


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
to be as simple as possible. Every thing should be done by file. The squadrons to act on a small front. The formations from file may be simplified as follows, and which contains every possible formation :

The Squadron should always file from the right, consequently have it in front. To form from file to the front, each man moves rapidly up on the left of his file-leader, and dresses to the right. To form to the rere, the leading file of front rank turns to the left about and halts, his rere-rank-man covering him. Each file gallops on till they come on his left, then turn to the left about, close, and dress to the right. To form to the right, the right file turns to his right, the rest pass in his rere, turn to the right and dress. To form to the left, the whole have only individually to turn to the left, dress, and close to the right. These simple evolutions, with the charge, and wheeling in Squadron, and going about by subdivision, are all that are necessary for such a corps to know, and this they might be taught in a week.

A corps of Hulans, which were in the service of the King of Poland, answered very well the idea of a yeomanry cavalry, and their establishment might be with little variation adopted here. They were Tartars and Mahomedans. The gentleman served in the front rank, and carried a lance with a vanderole, and a sabre ; his servant covered him in the rere rank, armed with a carbine and sabre. The use of the lance for the cavalry is not sufficiently understood. Great advantages may be derived from it, either in the charge or pursuit. The Cossacks use them in passing rivers ; they sound the depth of the water before them with the but of the lance.

Corps





*Fig. 1. Represents an Armed Peasant, to shew the manner
Cartridges, the horn priming powder, Fig. 2 is the sword, to*


Fig. 1.



Fig. 2.



the manner he is Accoutred, his Magazine holding his
 sword, two Feet long, 2 Inches $\frac{1}{2}$ broad.



Corps of peasantry (infantry) should be formed, of whom certainly, upon an average, four hundred could be found, who, under proper officers, might be entrusted with arms, in every county*. They might be formed in corps of fifty, each commanded by three officers, to wear their own clothing. They should have a musket without a bayonet†; a pouch like the new magazines, to hold cartridges and balls, a powder-born, and a sword two inches and a half broad, straight and pointed, and two feet in length, handle included, in a wooden scabbard. This weapon is somewhat similar to that of the Roman Legionaries, and is useful in the attack of a post, intrenchment, &c. They should not quit their county, and ought to be commanded by persons to whom they are attached by interest. When on duty they should receive a shilling a

* A person who considers every grey-coated man as a Defender, will shudder at the idea of arming any of the Irish peasantry. Let such weigh well this calculation:—There must be at least 23 Grand Jurors in every county in Ireland; what description of people must these be, if twenty of that number are not of sufficient consequence and influence in their county, to produce among their friends, tenants and dependents, with their adherents, twenty men each, to whom they would entrust arms for mutual defence? If this calculation is just, the number required is completed. These corps should assemble for practice on Sunday and holiday evenings; it would be an amusement, and tend to prevent idleness and debauchery. Where there is a police, the constables should be inrolled in them, and might act as subordinate officers.

† They should have no bayonet, to prevent as far as possible, their being put into the line, which they never ought to be; nor ought they ever to come within range of the musketry of regular troops. The best rule to lay down for such corps, is, that they should never fire upon their enemy, except from under cover; as, for instance, from a tree, ditch, house, &c. In the house a bayonet is a useless weapon, compared to the sword above described.


day

day and their rations. They should be practised at firing at a mark *, covering and concealing themselves, always acting two together, the one not firing till the other is loaded; but they should never be troubled with any manœuvre, either of tactic or parade, which always destroys the energy of the human faculties, and so far destroys the effect which ought to be derived from light troops †.

It will be right to consider, in case of an invasion, what will be the probable turn of mind of the people. Some of the peasantry would remain quiet spectators of the events of the war; some would join that party who seemed to bid fairest for success; others will join whoever invites them, by an offer of plunder. Some governments are afraid to put arms in the hands of the peasantry, for fear they should turn them against those by whom they were intrusted with them. It is a vain precaution, because, if they are determined upon it, they will find the means of getting them from the scene of war. According to the disposition they seemed to be in; if they shewed a good will to the cause, they might be attached to the army, form a chain of out-posts, get intelligence, &c. If they shewed

* Was this system of free corps of peasantry adopted, they might be invited to join the standard, or ordered back. If they were armed with pieces of a larger bore and greater length, to rest in order to take aim, the weight, as they have nothing else to carry, would not be of consequence, and they would throw a ball double the distance of the ordinary muskets.


† Ever since regular discipline has been introduced among the Imperial Croats, they have not been found so useful as they formerly were, in their capacity of flanking corps.



*This Plate represents an armed Peasant fully appointed
the Act of Firing, his Capote rolled on his back, and
his canteen and haversack for holding his provisions*



appointed for the Field, his long Musquet rested in
back, and his Sword in its proper place, together with
provisions.



a wavering disposition, they might be put at a considerable distance in the rear. They might also be employed to drive the cattle up the country, tho' this would be a precarious experiment. But then the question to be asked is, Can the soldiers be spared for that service at such a time?

In the year 1778, an invasion of England by the French was talked of. The instructions given by government were, that the army should drive the cattle up the country, and the farmers and peasantry march down to meet the enemy on the coast. It is to be supposed they meant to arm them. Probably they did not choose to trust them to drive their own cattle, as supposing, if a farmer could get a better price for his sheep from the French, than he could from his own countrymen, he would prefer the former. Some of the depots they had fixed on, were not five miles from the coast; they ought always to be farther than a possible day's march; the cavalry patrolled from village to village, often out of sight even of the coast, in the idea of conveying intelligence of the appearance of the enemy. Fixed stations of infantry, with signal staffs on the heights, are preferable. If either yeomanry, cavalry, or corps of peasantry, should be ordered from home, their families should not be suffered to go with them, but receive a maintenance from the magazines; they would be in fact a kind of hostage for their fidelity.

It would be necessary to form corps of burghers, in the cities and considerable towns, under the municipal officers; they would not require clothing. In the time of danger, with proper encouragement, every housekeeper would
associate

associate with his neighbours, for the mutual security of their properties*.

It would perhaps be alleged, it is dangerous to do all this; these people are not to be entrusted with arms, because they might use them against government. But surely, the times are replete with danger; there is danger in every step we can take; and all prudence can do, is, to weigh these dangers well, and adopt the lesser. If you do not put (it might be said to government) confidence in the people, they will not put confidence in you. In the time of alarm they will associate with those, who can afford protection from the mob of the country. That protection

* These are universally formed on the continent; they frequently are not clothed; a man may do his duty as well in a brown coat as a red one; all parade is mere childishness, answering merely *ad captandum vulgus*. The most important posts in Paris are entrusted to the citizens. One would think that would convince those who can be convinced by any thing, of the real state of the nation with whom we are at war. As to the armed peasantry, if they are commanded by officers who understand that service, and of course to teach them (which they would soon learn) how to act, they would be as useful in the field, in such a country as this, as the best regulars in Europe. The peasantry in Brittany, of whom the Chouans (so called from their war cry) are a part, much resemble ours in the more remote parts, and we see what they were capable of doing; but they were commanded by able officers. In a report to the Convention from that country, it was justly said, "The children of 12 years old carry arms against us, and those under that age act as spies." It is added, *ainsi en aton tué en grand nombre*, "blood will have blood." It is astonishing that people, whose minds have been humanised by education, should ever adopt the sanguinary plan, a plan which all history tells us, has constantly reverted on its inventors, in which the hand of Providence is marked.

"This even-handed justice, commends the ingredients of our poisoned chalice to our own lips."

MACBETH.

the

the enemy will offer them; they will offer them arms if they were wanted, which they are not, for the country is full of arms. It is better, at all events, to assume the appearance of confidence while it can be done, for sooner or later the people must ultimately be recurred to.

Let us now suppose, what will be the probable consequence of a peace; trade will open between this country and France; the wants of the two nations are mutual; we want many things they have, and they want all the articles our country produces. Our ports would be filled with their shipping, and our country overrun with their people. Can it be supposed they will not import their principles? It will be answered—but they must be kept down. It is just as possible to stop the progress of time, as to stop the progress of thought; now that the people every where are beginning to discover their own strength, it must be admitted, that the few cannot govern the many, except by opinion*.

If the yeomanry were established, it would then indeed be easy to disarm the rest of the nation; for instance, impose a duty of two guineas annually on every person keeping a gun, for which he must have a license from a magistrate; at the same time offer a certain price, to be paid for every one brought in, and impose a heavy penalty on any arms found in a person's possession without a license.

The necessity of a yeomanry cavalry, cannot be more urgent and visible than at present; for it seems, the regular cavalry cannot take the

* This has been called the Age of Reason, but it ought more properly to be, of Reasoning—of Discussion and Investigation.

field for want of forage. Every soldier's horse is a burthen on the country; he consumes the produce, and contributes nothing towards raising it. On the contrary, horses employed in agricultural business are not so, because they contribute their labour toward raising the produce of the soil. Now, though the horses of the yeomanry would not absolutely be of that description, yet, as all that number is now actually existing, and not one the more would be kept on account of the formation of these corps, they would not be as the horses of regulars, an additional burthen on the country, nor tend to increase the price of provisions; nor would it be necessary to lay in forage for them, unless in the case of actual invasion.

C H A P. VII.

System of Defence by Cordons.

TH E King of Prussia defends the Margraviate of Brandenburg, on the side of Saxony, by a camp at Wittemberg; on the side of Hanover, by the post of Werben; which, as he observes, secures it.

Foland recommends, for the defence of a river, when it is part of a cordon, small corps of two thousand men every five miles. This, with the reserves, would constitute a body of thirty thousand men, to defend fifty miles of front. His account of the battle of Cassano, and passage of the Adda, is very instructive.

Lloyd says, the more extensive a frontier the easier defended, because those who attack can act on one line only, whereas those who defend can act on several. There is scarce a spot from which those who defend may not draw supplies, whereas those who attack can draw them but from one. An assailing army should endeavour to come to a decisive action; a defending army should avoid one, or endeavour to render it indecisive.

The line of operations, is a line drawn from the point where your magazines, or subsistence, is collected. That which constitutes the ultimate object of your campaign, be your intention offensive or defensive, an invading army must choose the shortest time of operations; that of the defending army must be governed by the line adopted by the attacker.

If

If the defending army occupies a pass in front of the attacker, the latter must send a corps in the rear of it. If this corps is not beaten, the defending army must retire. The best way of destroying an invading army, is by acting on his flanks.

Before the system of defence is proceeded on, it is necessary to examine the possible routes for an enemy to take, to strike at the Capital, which we suppose the object of his attack.

They are as follows :

Landing in Lough-Foyle,

- | | | |
|---------------|---|--------------|
| 1. Strabane | } | 8 days march |
| 2. Omagh | | |
| 3. Augher | | |
| 4. Monaghan | | |
| 5. Cootehill | | |
| 6. Kingscourt | | |
| 7. Navan | | |
| 8. Dublin | | |

- | | | |
|-----------------------------|---|--------------|
| Secondly, by 1. Enniskillen | } | 9 days march |
| 2. Cavan | | |
| 3. Athboy | | |

- | | | |
|-----------------------|---|--------------|
| Thirdly, by Dungannon | } | 8 days march |
| Armagh | | |
| Dundalk | | |

- | | | |
|----------------------------------|---|--------------|
| From Sligo, by Carrick Mullingar | } | 7 days march |
| | | |

- | | | |
|----------------------|---|--------------|
| From the Shannon, by | } | 9 days march |
| Limerick | | |
| Birr, or | | |
| Maryboro' | | |

- | | | |
|-------------------------------|---|----------------|
| From Cork and the S. west, by | } | 10 days march. |
| Clonmell and | | |
| Kilkenny | | |
| or | | |
| Cashell and Durrow | | |

From

From Galway, by	}	6 days march.
Roscommon		
Lanesboro'		
Cross the Shannon		
Mullingar, or by		
Athenry		
Athlone		
Cross the Shannon		
Kilbeggan, or by		
Loughrea		
Banagher or Portumna		
Cross the Shannon		
Portarlington		

From this statement it appears, that the line from Galway to Dublin, being the shortest line of operation is that which it is most probable an enemy will adopt.

We may suppose a probable attack to be made by the enemy, thus: That he has established himself at Galway, and advances on his line of operation toward Dublin. He advances to the Shannon, leaves an intermediate post at Kilconnel, and menaces Athlone, Banagher and Portumna, or Clonsfert. This compels you to divide your force. He attacks one pass, penetrates and advances.

We suppose a plan of defence by cordons. The first cordon embracing the Capital, thus :

1. The Boyne to Trim,
2. Edenderry,
3. Rathangan,
4. Kilcullen,
5. Liffey,

From that to

Blessington,
Bray River,
Sea.

E

This

This gives a cordon of sixty miles; the extremity of each flank being thirty miles distant from the centre; supposing it defended by one army, posted at or near Edenderry; the sea on each flank.

Second Cordon :

1. Gore's Bridge,
2. Kilkenny,
3. Roscrea,
4. Banagher,
5. Athlone,
6. Colehill,
7. Finac,
8. Kingcourt.

Three corps would be necessary on this, *pour se donner mutuel élément les mains.*

Third Cordon :

1. Cork,
2. Charleville,
3. Limerick,
4. Shannon to
5. Carrick,
6. Enniskillen,
7. Dungannon,
8. Newry.

This is a line of twelve days march, constituting the exterior cordon, of which the Shannon is a principal part of the frontier. This should be occupied by camps or cantonments, and is the grand line of operation, and that whereon the troops should remain until the enemy develops

lopes his plans. This line would require the following force, thus distributed, viz.

At Cork	4,000 men
Charleville	1,000
Limerick	3,000
Athlone	6,000
Eaniskillen	1,000
Dungannon	2,000
Newry	1,000
With a strong advanced camp at Galway	5,000
Killaloe	2,000
Portumna	2,000
Lanesboro'	2,000
Carrick	1,000
<hr/>	
30,000 Total.	

The reasons why it is probable an enemy would prefer Galway to any other of the possible routes, are, that those by the north, as well as by the south-west of the kingdom, are less capable of supplying his army; besides, that the face of the country presents much more difficulty to him, and would oblige him to proceed with more slowness and caution, than the route from Galway would require, which would be disadvantageous to him, in addition to the line of operations being considerably longer. From Galway the country is more open. If he crosses at Lanesboro', he has afterwards the Inny to cross, which affords a position. Banagher is on a salient bow of the river, and therefore capable of defence.

Lloyd says, If a river runs along your frontier, endeavour to occupy two or three capital points

on it, with good and extensive fortresses, so that you may not only cover your own country, but also make it impossible for an enemy to penetrate, without giving you an opportunity of entering his, and cutting off his subsistence.

Of a river on a frontier he also says, tho' it be not navigable, it may be of great use in military operations, if it runs parallel to the frontier and crosses the principal roads, because it then furnishes good positions on its banks. An army cannot prevent the enemy throwing a bridge under the protection of his artillery, but it may prevent him from occupying such an extent of ground, as is necessary for him to deploy, and may attack it in any part without being exposed to his artillery.

An invading army requires the direct roads to be in good order, and the cross roads broken. A defending army, on the contrary, should cause the direct roads to be broken, and the cross roads made good.

The centre of the cordons of defence, is one and the same with the point of the enemy's line of operation, that is of course Dublin; the grand or exterior cordon being fully occupied with its due proportion of troops, and an advanced army stationed at Galway, which, for the reasons before and hereafter to be specified, is most likely to be the point of debarkation. Having fortresses fully garrisoned on the Shannon, and a strong garrison in the capital, with a camp of reserve between it and the grand cordon, and able to act upon either, the island may then, so far as the exterior enemy is in question, be considered as able to make a stand; for it would be presumptuous indeed to say, it was in a complete state of defence. The troops supposed to be
be

be destined for the cordon, garrisons, &c. must be infantry and artillery, with small detachments of light cavalry to each corps or army; and hosts of the same along the coast, for which service 3,000 light cavalry would be sufficient; the remainder of the cavalry captioned through the counties, to maintain internal peace, which, reckoning three hundred in each county, a low computation, would take 10,000 more; the garrison for the capital to be five thousand, and the army of reserve ten thousand. The number of troops, therefore, requisite to put this country in a state of safety, would thus amount to something less than sixty thousand men, actually fit for the field.

If the question is asked, Why disperse your army in a cordon?—keep them in great bodies, able to march to any point at a minute's notice. To this it is to be observed, that it is only possible to guess where the descent may be made. They may threaten * five points at the same time, and it shall be impossible, to the stations on the coast, to tell which is the real attack, until they have absolutely landed. Suppose five expresses to government, from different quarters of the island, announce an enemy on

* The French bring great numbers into action. Where a nation has such immense force of men, it is generally misapplied; they throw their numbers into such vast bodies, as to become unmanageable. The true way of employing them to advantage has been discovered by the French, of dividing and attacking upon many points at once. This forces their enemy to divide; he is of course inferior every where, and beaten in detail. It is never the interest of the smaller force to divide, if it can keep together. An army of forty thousand men may beat an army of eighty thousand, because that number cannot be brought into action. But divide them into four parts; the four armies of twenty thousand will invariably beat those composed of ten.

the

the coast. Three of these perhaps are squadrons of frigates; one an army of amusement, making a feint; the other the grand army. If the army for defence of the kingdom is in two camps, it is impossible that the army of the south could quit its station to act in the north, and *vice versa*. But even if it could be imprudent enough to do so on the first report, what would be the consequence? The false attacks meeting no resistance, would become real ones. But where are the magazines to maintain together a great force in one point? How will they be supplied on the march? Either you quit your magazines to meet the enemy on the coast, or you remain in your central position, (not being able to quit them) for the enemy are to come to you; in that case you are obliged to act on a cordon. Immediately on such intelligence as above coming to the seat of government, what would be the orders?—not to march, but—report; a second report must be made, and how soon? by the time the enemy have actually debarked, and when they are formed on your coast. Then indeed comes the word, march! but in what form? you meet the enemy on the coast if he chooses to wait there; if he does not, *where* do you meet him? If it is not too presumptuous it might be said, it *must* be on some part of the cordon, as above laid down. You come to an action; if you beat him, you pursue him. But suppose it turns out otherwise, that he comes on you with superior force, or beats you, you *must* retreat to the second cordon, to the third cordon; concentrate your force there, if you can; if not, fall back on the capital.

But

But if your armies are in two great corps, your magazines must be with them. If you march down then to the coast, your line of operation becomes longer than your enemy's. Yet the whole of your magazines must follow, or you may be cut off from them. If you cannot keep the field, but must come to an immediate action for want of them, you do exactly what the enemy wishes. Your centre magazines would be much better supplied, by substituting smaller ones in different stations.

It will be proved from experience, that the system of cordons has always been adopted, and when it has failed the fault was not there. The reasons why the system of cordons is the best, are: First, your troops are easier maintained: Secondly, they are easier drawn together: Thirdly, their positions must be better chosen: And Fourthly, that if the enemy, after being opposed in force on the cordon, succeeds and penetrates, he does not get at your magazines, but you cut off his; for when he advances, the troops left on the cordon act upon the flanks of his line of operations, cut off his supplies, and harass his rear. If he defeats your army, your grand magazines fall into his hands; but if they are detached upon the cordon, he cannot turn out of his line to seize them.

That they are easier maintained, being dispersed at twenty or fifteen miles distance, than if they were assembled in a grand army at any one point, is pretty obvious. The reason why they are easier drawn together is that their magazines are not confined to a point. Thus, for example, an enemy is in the west; orders come for the troops on the grand cordon to rendezvous at

Athlone;

Athlone; the orders are issued, and the post is occupied as follows :

First day, garrison consists of	-	-	6,000 Men.
That day there arrives from Portumna	-	2,000	
Laneboro'	-	2,000	
At Galway	-	5,000	
			<hr/>
There are thus brought together in one day			15,000
The second day	from Killaloe	2,000	} 3,000
	Carrick	1,000	
The third day from Dublin the army			
of reserve		10,000	} 14,000
	Enniskillen	1,000	
	Limerick	3,000	
			<hr/>
			32,000

Thus, 32,000 men are brought together in three days. There is no difficulty for forage, &c. as they find it at the several posts on their march upon the cordon. The same in regard to carriages; the roads, it is supposed, they must have in proper order, and be well acquainted with. The army of reserve should be able to march, for instance, on at least two columns; the troops from the cordon, being fewer in number, might march on one. It would not be necessary for the magazines to follow, for this reason, that if there is at Athlone provisions for six thousand men (as there ought) for two months, there are provisions for thirty thousand for ten days; and during the interval of the enemy's being on the coast, they should forage with large parties in the front of their cordon, and if possible reduce it to a desert. But if the army waits the advance of the enemy, whatever redundant forage is collected, should be sent back at least behind the second cordon, and not more than fourteen days provisions

provisions left with the grand army at one time.

The troops on the extremity of the frontier, would at the same time close inwards. A detachment from Cork would occupy Limerick in three days, and from Dungannon to Carrick in the same period. If the grand army is beaten, those flank corps act upon the flanks of the enemy as he advances; and the defending army occupies the position previously ascertained on the second cordon, where its magazines are ready formed. It must be observed, that there are forced marches, but certainly not an unreasonable calculation, for an army freed from baggage, and the longest march not exceeding three days.

The positions upon these cordons, forage, and roads, should be previously examined, and the state of forage both in front and rear reported. Where the roads are not good they should be repaired, and where wanting opened.

The advantage also of a cordon is, that by retreating you concentrate your force; thus, if not strong enough to oppose on the first cordon, call back all your troops to the second. This will be further elucidated, by considering Dalton's cordon, between the Elbe and Iser.

If the alarm is a false one, the troops are easily countermanded. If the enemy lands on a flank, it of course takes double the time to bring the same number together; therefore, the reserves should be stationed a portée of the weakest part, and the flanks strengthened as much as possible; at all events, positions should be chosen in the rear.

N. B. Soldiers should learn to use shoes like the Croats, of undressed leather; by which an infinite trouble in campaigns would be saved.

to

to assemble on. Wherever an action is to be risked, the defending army have it in their power to appoint the field, which is in front of their position. This they can turn to their advantage thus: if they are superior in cavalry, open the ground for 800 yards front of the flanks, and occupy it by the cavalry. If your army manœuvres, give yourself room. If it is composed of troops that you cannot rely on in face of an enemy, occupy hedges and ditches, taking care to cut intervals in them, but always so that they are flanked with musquetry. Break up all the passes, roads, &c. in front of your grand cordon, except what it is for your own convenience to keep.

Always forage in front. Keep not more than fourteen days provisions in the magazines on your grand cordon; form them also on your second, and send back all your redundancy there. The enemy will thus find nothing on landing. The advanced corps on the coast should never have more there than one week's provisions in the magazines. Dalton occupied his famous position between the Iser and the Elbe, with 26 battalions and 14 squadrons, forming an arc of upwards of a hundred miles, the mountains in his front, the curve toward the enemy.

They were cantoned as follows:

Reichenber,	2 Battlions.	Leitneritz &	} 2
Lagebruch	2	Teschén	
Bomisch Ancher	4	Seeferdorf	2
Liebennau	2	Penkraty	2
Reichstadt &	} 2	Remburg	1
Leipze		Georgethal	1
Memes &	} 2		
Gabel			

The cavalry distributed by Greisdorf, Einsiedel, Ober and Nieder Grand, were cantoned in the open

open country, and in the centre of his line; his infantry in the mountainous parts. Had he been attacked, his intention was to take a position between Reichenberg and the Jeschkowberg. As he fell back, he would have at the same time concentrated his forces. The King of Prussia said, his position was stronger than the citadel of Lille. By the excellence of this cordon, the hereditary dominions are covered by thirty thousand men effectually; but these points are all studied by the Austrian and Prussian officers, in time of peace, and when they go into the field, they are perfectly acquainted with the strong and weak part of every position.

M. Catinat was obliged, in 1692, to defend a greater frontier with about the same force, but failed for want of magazines and carriages. An army cannot be expected to act, if deprived thus of locomotive powers. His line of defence extended from the Lake of Geneva to the Mediterranean.

Two examples of passage of a river are selected, because they furnish an idea of the system of frontier war. The Prince of Conti, obliged to pass the Rhine, retired to his two bridges, a league below Worms, where the Rhine forms an elbow. He encamped at Nordheim, the brook Hoffheim to his right, the river Wirchnitz to his left, a part of his army thrown back along the river to the village of Vattenheim; he threw up detached redoubts, which supported each other mutually along his whole front, between the two rivers, and some near the village of Bolstat, a quarter of a league in his front; five redoubts were made round the heads of the bridges, and the enemy could not pass without first taking them. The baggage passed during
the

the night. At day-break a corps of cavalry shewed itself, formed at Bolstat, and the army crossed the Rhine. When the troops formed before Bolstat, who masked the retreat, began also to retire, they were harassed by some irregulars, but being supported, retired in order to the redoubts, covering the bridges; *these* checked the enemy, and they were pursued and driven back to Bolstat. Here the superiority of redoubts over lines proved itself. The enemy could not have been pursued from the latter, without the army's desiling, by which a precious time would have been lost.

Montecuculi wished to penetrate into Alsace by Strasburgh, where also his magazines and bridges were. Turenne taking a position near that city, compelled it to a neutrality, and of course entrance was refused to Montecuculi, but it was the latter's object to remove Turenne from his position commanding Strasburgh; he therefore made a feint as if he meant to besiege Phillipsburgh. It was also Turenne's object to cut off Montecuculi's communication with Strasburgh, and thereby from his magazines and bridge. When therefore the latter moved toward Phillipsburgh, Turenne threw a reinforcement into that place, and then crossed the Rhine, and occupied the strong camp of Vilslett, by which he carried the following great points: he cut off Montecuculi's communication with his magazines, carried the war out of his own country, prevented any possibility of the enemy's penetrating there, and ultimately obliged his adversary to fall back, and lose the whole campaign, as effectually as he could have done it by the most signal defeat.

This

This is a most instructive lesson, where the war is carried on upon great rivers which are not easily fordable; when that happens the business assumes a new face; and it is necessary to watch every where, the grand army retaining a central position; a partiè, to succour the whole. The scene of Montecuculi's manœuvres was about sixty miles in extent.

CHAP. VIII.

ANOTHER system of defence may be, by concentrating the great force of the kingdom at Athlone, and forming the military depot for the whole there, leaving garrisons of not less than 5,000 men in the capital, and in the north and west parts of the kingdom. In this case it would be necessary to have a large force in the county of Cork, as it would otherwise take six days march for an army, in case of an enemy landing there. Limerick also must be strongly occupied; but if Galway were threatened at the same time, the Athlone army would be held in check; while an army landing in the south-west could march direct by Clonmell and the Barrow, crossing that river and leaving it on its left for Dublin; the whole of which route the country is abundantly provided with all things necessary for its support. In that case, if the Cork army acts on the flank of the enemy, the Athlone army must fall back on Dublin. This gives an enemy, if in any force on the coast of Galway, an opportunity of landing and penetrating to the Shannon; then the two enemy's armies might effect a junction, as to a moral certainty; all the out corps must be called in, to form and defend the Capital.

If the grand army is attacked with a great force on the Leinster side of the Shannon, and at the same time with another force from
Galway,

Galway, its retreat is cut off; it can occupy no position, and must if defeated be destroyed, and the island conquered; therefore, it cannot in that case stay there, it must fall back to the third cordon; then all its magazines at Athlone are lost.

If a central army marches to the south point of the kingdom, it cannot protect the Shannon, and if the Shannon is ever gained by an enemy's army of 40,000 men, all the forces of the empire will not dislodge it; nor could the army from the south fall back in time to protect the Capital. At any rate the magazines ought not to be formed at Athlone, but considerably in the rear. It is also certain, that take what position on the Shannon you will, if a hostile detachment lands either in the north or west, it is on your rear; you must either beat it or retire. Nor can a cordon be formed according to this plan; the communication with the capital must be maintained by an intermediate post. Let the great position be where it will, Dublin must be maintained, in order to preserve the communication with England. This intermediate force must be strong, or it is nothing; if you make it strong, you so far diminish the force you oppose to the enemy.

CHAP. IX.

On Camps—Positions—and Inundations.

THE King of Prussia says, get good provincial charts and study them, impressing on the mind the names and situations of cities, rivers, and chains of mountains. Having acquired a general idea of the country, proceed to particulars; examine the direction of the roads, where an attack would be likely to be attended with most ease and success, and what force would be required; how far rivers are navigable, and where fordable; discover if they are dry in summer, or impassable in winter; observe the state of the lands, and what the general produce is; by what route an army can march from one city or river to another, and mark the best positions on these routes. Of plain and open countries we easily acquire an idea, of mountainous and woody with more difficulty, yet they must be known; ride into them with your map in your hand; take peasants, hunters, &c. with you; ascend the highest grounds, compare their answers with your map. Observe how many columns could march, or if it is possible to turn the enemy's rear or flank. Mark where a defensive camp could be taken, but particularly observe the gorges, or debouchures. Revolve in your mind all the possible contingencies that can take place in those situations, so that if they become

come the seat of war, you may carry a clear impression of the whole in your mind. This must be done while you have leisure, and are unobstructed.

The following circumstances are required and absolutely necessary to a camp, viz. wood and water. The front should be covered, and the rear open.

The coup d'œil consists in the following faculties: the first is, to judge how many troops will occupy a certain position, from examining it with the eye. The second, which is a much more arduous talent, consists in being able to seize at once (mentally) and decide upon every advantage the locality can give. [This talent practice can acquire and perfect.] An able general turns the smallest height, a hollow road, a ditch, to his advantage.

The square of six miles will afford two hundred positions, and no two alike. A general's eye at the first glance decides which of all of them is the best.

Nothing is so difficult, (says the King) as to defend the passage of a river for a considerable length. I would never undertake it if it exceeded fifty miles, or was fordable. He remarks, that if you have a river in front, your field of battle must be within half musquet shot of your position.

The King of Prussia, by taking post at Wittenberg, covers a part of an hundred and fifty miles of country. With his two armies he covers upward of two hundred. The camp of Perna is an example of an impregnable post, seventeen thousand men defended a front of seven miles.

The King of Prussia says, in choosing a position for a camp, to cover a country, it is not merely the strength of that position which is to be considered, but its relative situation; that is to say, that it must not only be strong, but it must be so situated that notwithstanding its strength, the enemy *must* attack it, in order to proceed upon his plans. It cannot be expected that such a position should cover every possible road that the enemy could advance on; but it must command those which are most material to his grand design. It must be such a one, that in case of attack, the army which defends it must have no cause of apprehension, and that the enemy must have great doubt of his success; and also such a one, that the enemy cannot avoid, without subjecting himself to the greatest risque and inconveniency; that he must make wide circuitous marches to avoid it, while I by small movements can anticipate him in all his attempts.

The position at Nieustadt covers all Lower Silesia, on the side of Moravia, a frontier of a hundred miles; the river and town in front of the post. If the enemy attempts to pass between Ollmachen and Glatz, a movement between Neus and Ziegenhals cuts his communication off with Moravia; a camp between Schomberg and Liebau, guards Silesia on the side of Bohemia. An enemy cannot advance on the side of Cone, if I am posted between Troppau and Yagern-dorff; if he does, his convoys are cut off.

Positions are natural fortification. All that is requisite is the talent to see and to choose them. From the above examples the following conclusion is to be drawn: that however necessary fortresses may be, and however expedient it is for a nation

to

to have its most important posts fortified, yet that they do not constitute the best or only defence of a country; and that it is by manœuvring armies and able generals, that they are to be either conquered or defended.

It is always prudent to intrench the camp in the neighbourhood of the enemy, taking care to leave many and large debouchures, that the movements of the army may not be cramped. No difficult ground should intersect a camp; if there is any such, numerous passes ought immediately to be made over it.

An army commands as much of a position, as it is in reach of in an easy day's march, on both flanks. If the enemy is ten miles in your front; you must be acquainted with his movements. If he marches to your right flank, you extend yourself in your position to your right; the position should always describe an arc; the curve to the enemy. Two armies of ten thousand men each, will occupy a country for 30 miles. If it is meant for a defensive position; break up bridges and roads in the front, and throw chevaux-de-frize, &c. in the fords, to make the advance on it difficult. If it is meant to march toward the enemy, open as many roads as possible, that the army may be put upon as many columns as its strength requires. Always detach out-lying piquets and grand guard beyond rivers. If it is near you, throw up works to defend the bridges or fords you leave passable; and occupy the mountains with your armed peasantry, if you have them.

The mountains of Ireland are not like those of the continent, to which the King of Prussia alludes, as before quoted: they bear no campaign, therefore a foreign officer, reading of the mountains in this

country, would be quite deceived if he imagined them to be rough, rocky, covered with fine forests, producing grain, inhabited, and with narrow defiles. Ours are wild high wastes, boggy, and unfit for man or beast, but entirely open.

The bogs in Ireland, are sometimes insulated, and more frequently in chains. They seem to have been originally formed by the casual obstruction of some small stream of water, not of sufficient force to work a channel for itself, and stagnating in this moist climate, where the sun has not power to make it evaporate quickly, and where the tendency to vegetation is very great. A spongy substance forms itself, increases of course the stagnation, retains the moisture, and grows from year to year. Probably if the country were not inhabited, and the exertion of human industry opposed to this process of nature, in a few centuries all Ireland would be one vast bog. These bogs are, some more and some less, to a certain degree passable in summer, for men, but unable to bear a horse or carriage. They have generally a very gradual fall, as the principle of their formation evinces, which is necessary to be observed, as their use in a military light in a great measure depends on this circumstance. They are generally surrounded, immediately at their edges, by elevated ground which commands them.

The more water is obstructed, the more impassable the bog behind it becomes, and where an army can have ground of this kind on its front or flank, it should endeavour to render that part of their position impracticable, wherever a head of water could by means of dams be formed with most advantage. By doing it, these bogs spread to a very wide extent, and in parts contract

tract very narrow. The narrowest point thro' which the stream runs, should be taken for making the inundation, by throwing a dam from the projecting point of the high ground, on one side, to that on the opposite. This should be commanded, especially the lower side, by a work mounted with artillery, which should rake the whole of the embankment. It should be covered by chevaux-de-frise, an abbatis, &c. or strong pallisades; the bogs often supply timber of oak fit for this. If the fall is one yard in two hundred, which is a medium calculation, an embankment of this kind twenty-one feet high, will inundate the position for near an English mile; but it would render all the bog behind it impassable, by its absorbing the water, and become too wet to bear a man, especially if assisted by rains.

Our rivers are generally small; but with strong banks, therefore, of great consequence in military operations. No river is so deep or so wide, as to be relied on for security; it must still be guarded. They are the most certain features in the face of a country; they mark the ground for military operations, and are in nature what scales and degrees are on a map. If an army occupies a position, a river is most advantageous on its front; if an army is in march, on its flank.

A dry season may render a river passable where it never was; sometimes fords are not known except to very few. No river is so large, that it ought to be considered impassable; nor none so small, that advantage may not be drawn from it. Any mill-stream may be turned to the purpose of inundation.

The

The greatest position afforded in Ireland, is the west bank of the Shannon; another presents itself from Maguire's bridge, to Charlemont in the north. One might also be taken from Portadown to Newry; also from Belturbet to Carrick. From Kilkenny to Nenagh affords a chain of positions of a great extent.

Every position that it is possible could ever be required, should be previously examined; its advantages and disadvantages noted down; the points to be fortified, marked; the quantity of artillery and troops it would require, entered down, that at a minute's notice it might be occupied; if it is to be fortified, the peasantry on the arrival of the officer of engineers might be immediately set to work, in case of invasion.

Instead of bat horses, two-wheeled carriages should be ordered for the conveyance of the troops' baggage; they should be so constructed that they could be taken to pieces, and carried over difficult passes; as also, in case of a horse sinking, that they might be put on others.

It would be advisable to have flying corps, composed of ten companies of grenadiers or light infantry, with four field pieces, and a squadron of light dragoons; they would be advanced in front of the grand army; they ought to be disincumbered of all unnecessary baggage, and carry an additional number of rounds of ammunition. Every man should have a blanket large enough to cover his head and feet, and a watch coat made as light as possible*.

* The shoes of undressed leather, used by the Croats, might be adopted to great advantage by our military, if they only used them on marches. The consumption and expence of shoes is inconceivable. In that case every man could make his own. All that is requisite is a piece of undressed hide, which he cuts to the shape of the foot; it laces from the toe to above the ankle.

Gun-

Gun-boats on the lakes, and at the entrance of the Shannon, would be of use.

If two armies execute flank movements, each on their respective positions, in order to pre-occupy a post, pass, &c. and one has a greater length of march to perform than the other, that disadvantage must be got over, either by making the road more easy, or so that a greater front may march on it; or secondly, by turning the attention of the enemy, by a diversion on some other point, and so concealing your movement, unless there is a sufficient force to be able to detach cavalry to harass his rear, or light infantry to intercept him at a defile.

Whichever army occupies the pass first, the other cannot force it in his presence, nor can the occupier, although so far master of it, attempt the passage in the face of his adversary, without the greatest precaution.

The advantages of high ground for positions, are, that the enemy's movements are all open to you, while yours are concealed from him. In case of an attack, he is exposed to the fire of your artillery and musquetry, while his has little effect on you. If an army has an enemy in front, and advances, it must open roads; but in flank marches, three roads are all required. If there is but one made road, that should be reserved for the baggage, and other roads should be opened for the two columns. These flank roads should be marked out on the army's coming into its position; they should be wide enough to admit a company in front.

When an army marches into a country, where it has not had time to prepare the roads, for example, in five columns, each column will have

its guides in front, who by camp colours will mark out the route of the column, according to the directions of the quarter-master-general; the pioneers follow the guides, and level the road for their column; the baggage should, if possible, march on the high road.

The army ought to have so many roads open in rere of its position, as in case of necessity to be able to retreat on six columns.

C H A P. X.

Duty of Officers.

WHEN an officer, of what rank soever, arrives at his post, he should come provided with the best general and local maps he can procure. If it is on the coast, he should also get a chart of it. These he should compare with the ground, examine what depth of water there is, how high the tide rises, where shipping would command the shore, and where they would be commanded by it. He should examine all the roads, passes, rivers, fords, mountains and positions, calculate their distances by his computation, for instance, by the time he takes in going from one to the other. He should examine the state of the country as to forage, take the number of mills, how much they usually work, and what they they have in store; inquire where corn and other articles of provision are kept; what fairs there are, and whence the cattle are brought. He should cultivate acquaintance with the people of the country, and endeavor to find out their temper and disposition, in order to be able to answer inquiries, and point them out to his superiors. He should be on horseback constantly, when not on other duties; examine things with his own eyes, and not trust to reports. If there are no maps of the country, he must compute the distances of towns, roads, rivers, &c. and from rough maps
from

from his own calculations. Where there is a position, he should measure the distance of the neighbouring heights by paces, and see if it is commanded; this knowledge, previously acquired, will give him confidence in a time of danger. In time of harvest he should calculate, how much corn of all sorts is in the country, and inquire whither it usually goes.

Fuel is an essential article; he should inquire what stock there is of that, if there is a sufficiency for troops in case of being put in winter cantonments. All this inquiry is necessary, to possess an officer with that general and miscellaneous knowledge, without which he never can be of use.

If he is in an advanced post, he must be cautious not to give unnecessary alarms, to impress the public with an idea of extraordinary alertness; and not transmit a report, till he has examined into the foundation of it himself.

The following anecdote of the great Gustavus Adolphus, transmitted to us by Prince Henry of Prussia, strongly authorize the principles here laid down. His words are: " Il dit, (Schildknecht officier d'ingénieurs) que le Monarque Suédois étant au camp de Beerwalde, avoit projeté de s'emparer d'un défilé, pour surprendre les Impériaux dans leur camp. Mais que comme il ne se fioit jamais aux cartes gravées, & qu'il étoit impossible d'aller reconnoître le terrain parceque l'ennemi l'occupoit, cet ingénieur en fit le plan d'après le rapport des habitans, & le présenta aux Roi qui dirigea sa marche en conséquence, mais l'armée avant d'arriver au défilé, se trouva tout d'un coup, vis-à-vis d'un marais qui n'étoit pas marqué dans le plan de l'ingénieur. Ce marais pouvoit

pouvoit être défendu par l'ennemi, & coûter beaucoup de monde aux Suedois. Le Roi rebroussa chemin, & traita fort mal le pauvre Schildknecht, qui assura sa Majesté que le plan avoit été fait sur le rapport d'un vieux gentilhomme & d'un ecclésiastique du lieu. Eh bien, dit le Roi en plaisantant, suivez ces braves gens, & faites vous montrer ce marais pour n'en pas tromper d'autres.

CHAP. XL

On the internal Situation of the Country.

IF you have no great magazines, and live only from day to day, and the people of the country are ill affected to you, and cut off your daily and casual supplies, what becomes of the war? If a country is in a state of defence, there should be a year's provision in advance in the military magazines. If there is not a sufficiency wherever the army comes, they or the people of the country must starve. The consequence of starving is desperation and pillage. What kind of foraging parties must you then send out? There is no country where a good understanding between the army and country people is so necessary, as in Ireland. At any rate, your magazines ought to be formed this year for the ensuing one. Suppose you are obliged to take the field in March or April, such a thing is impossible. Where is your corn, potatoes, or fuel; where forage for your cavalry before August? These are serious considerations, and no one thinks of them. The generality of people imagine, all that is necessary for an army to take the field, is to have canvas to cover them.

The business of maintaining an army, so as to keep its operations unclogged, is a science by itself. It must be considered, that in an emergency, the country will be charged cent. per cent. more

more than the value. Whatever it bought in the country might be paid in government debentures; small ones might be struck off for that purpose.

What is the loss of ten sail of the line and two hundred transports, to the French, compared to getting possession of this country? It is to be hoped government will see the consequence of it in due time. In four days from the appearance of an enemy on the coast, it is possible for them to be in possession of all Connaught, and probably a considerable part of Ulster. Imagine the situation of this country, with forty thousand French on the west of the Shannon, and ten thousand from Belturbet to Newry. If our forces advance toward Connaught, the French army of the north is in their rear; if against the north, the army from Connaught is on their left and rear.

Immediately on landing, the enemy would most probably publish a proclamation, offering indemnity and security to all who staid at home, and inviting the country people to bring provisions to his camp. This would open a communication between them, and facilitate his means of procuring intelligence. If he found the people of the country ill affected to the government, he would deliver out arms to them, and take them in pay, form pioneers, free corps, &c.

Probably no inducement could make an Englishman act in concert with a Frenchman; such is their antipathy. There is as yet no affection between the two nations here, but there certainly is no antipathy to the French.

Any one who has seen the wealth and happiness of the Dutch and Flemish peasantry, and afterwards seen them run over to their invader, will be

be apt to inquire, if there are any peculiar circumstances in the case of the Irish peasantry, which will induce them to adopt a contrary conduct. If they are not more wealthy, more happy, and more independent; if they are not more attached to their laws and government; if they have not more reason to be so, is it probable that they will adopt a contrary conduct? The Flemings certainly lived under a happy government, and had no reason to dislike the House of Austria. Every well-wisher to his country ought to consider these points in time; in the moment of danger it is too late, and we must at last recur to the peasantry for protection*.

One cannot but be surprized, that the importance of this country should have struck the world in general so little of late years. Previous to the independence of America, it was an obscure spot at the extremity of the old world, and would probably have remained so, had America continued to be peopled only with savages. Ignorant of navigation; and consequently incapable of coming forward in the great theatre of the human race. America has as yet much to do at home; probably it will be many years before she will begin to shew all her greatness in action, before she will have her due weight in the political balance of the world; but if their

* The planters in the West-India islands are obliged to adopt the desperate resource of arming their negro slaves, and our men of property are afraid to trust their own tenants! If this is the case, can any thing be more desperate than our situation? The French, when their country was invaded, armed the whole people, and the people did not betray their trust. How wretched then must be the situation of those, who are afraid to recur to such an expedient, and with what face will they attempt it, when it can be no longer avoided.

progress

progress increases in the same proportion that it has done, and there is every reason to think it will do even more; they will probably cause a revolution in the affairs of the world, in which these countries will participate more deeply than any other.

Ireland, situated between the two continents, is, notwithstanding the misfortunes of six centuries, now increasing in wealth, in civilization, and population. Happy would it be if the two former kept pace with the last; but unfortunately the drain of the upper classes of the people and their money to England, is such, as prevents the country's deriving all or near the advantages nature and the times hold out to her. It is to be hoped, that the connection between the two countries will be ever maintained; yet this war England seems to have either despised the power of France too much, or it relied too much on the natural strength of Ireland; or finally, it was not aware of its consequence; for it was left by her in what may in the most unqualified manner be called, an absolutely defenceless state.

Ireland contains about five millions of people of all descriptions, of whom the poor are at least four million seven hundred thousand. By poor is meant, not farmers and tradesmen, but those who are obliged to work to earn their sustenance from day to day. One reason for this great proportion of poor, is, that every man marries. In most other countries people do not, unless they have some prospect of a maintenance for their families. It were to be wished that in this country, property and independence, (without a certain degree of which mankind will not be at rest) were more diffused. It is true, men are never to be satisfied. A monarch who possesses dominions

dominions larger than the rest of Europe, finds that a spot of her neighbour's territory lies convenient, and seizes it. Here is no stimulus of want, but merely the love of acquisitions, that Providence has implanted in the human mind. Can it then be wondered at, if what is commonly called the mob, that part of society composed of all that is wretched, all that is outcast, and all that is hopeless, should turn upon the property of their wealthy neighbour, when an opportunity offers. If it is said, they were born and are used to their situation, that is the language of unfeeling folly. That country is wretched, indeed, where ninety-nine in every hundred see and feel, that no change, no revolution, can possibly make them worse or more miserable than they actually are. From such a state of thinking they must look with anxiety for a change.

Where the inhabitants of a country are diffused among themselves, that country cannot enjoy security. All patriotism is smothered in the effervescence of private animosities, and the most destructive passions. Such, happily, is not the state of England; nor will it any where else add to the strength or security of her empire*. England for many years engrossed the trade and wealth of the universe, without a rival, and founded her splendor on it; but it is not in the nature of things that it can be always so; trade will in time find its level, and all cannot be gainers.

Should England decline, in proportion to her decadence, the value of Ireland to her increases; the attachment of Ireland should also increase, united by situation, language, manners, and common interest. Such a band ought to be indissoluble.

* Witness the late events in the West-Indies.

The best way to perpetuate it is, by endeavouring to convince both nations, that is to say, not the few but the great mass of both nations that *they* are benefited by the connection; and let not the multitude be despised by the rich and great. It is that the rich may enjoy ease, that the poor man labours; and for their security that the poor fight and bleed. In the hour of danger and distress, the great, the powerful, and the wealthy, must throw themselves for protection on their poor neighbours, for their lives, their families, and their properties. It is therefore the particular interest, not of the poor, but of the rich, to endeavour to make the cause of the nation a common one. If it is alledged, that the lower orders will not believe the arguments adduced in such a question, still the principle is undeniable, and it is an additional reason against procrastinating the only security of the rich until the hour of danger—it is then too late.

And it will be well for those who have power to remember, that if the poorer classes are the people, it is for the happiness of the people that power has been delegated to them; that a national cause is not the cause of the few, but of the many.

La Jaquerie was the name given to a most dreadful civil war, with which France was once scourged. It was an insurrection of the peasantry, owing to the oppression of the nobles.

The Hungarian peasantry in their last insurrection, to which they were goaded by every species of oppression, committed dreadful excesses, shutting up the nobility in their castles, and
 G setting

setting fire to them, &c. Horiah and Klosskar were delegated by the peasants to present their petition to the Emperor. Horiah was a man of great talents. It is reported the answer of the Emperor was in the following words: "It is all your own fault."

Poland has neither strong ground, nor rivers, nor fortresses; its people are dispirited by their state of vassalage; they are treated every where with indignity. A postilion exercises his whip on every unfortunate peasant with impunity, who is not able to get out of his way in time. They are abject, unprincipled, drunken and licentious. Having no security for property, they have no business to acquire more than sustains them from day to day; and their nobility are under no tie to treat them well. Yet when the country was invaded, the defenders of it were headed by tradesmen (shoemakers) of Warsaw, and the nobility did not then disdain their station or their assistance.

There is something so extraordinary in the following, that the translation of it, from the original German, may not be unacceptable:

"War must be carried on, either in our own, or in a neutral, or in an enemy's country. If I had no view but to my own glory, I would always prefer making my own dominions the seat of war. As there, every man serves for a spy, and the enemy cannot stir a step without its being known, I can then send out large or small parties without apprehension, and make any movement I please without risque. If the enemy is beaten, every peasant becomes a soldier and har-
rasses

raffes the enemy. Of that the Elector Frederick William had experience, after the battle of Fehrbellin, where the peasants killed more of the Swedish soldiers, than there were slain in the action; and the same circumstance happened to me after the battle of Hohenfriedberg, where the mountaineers of Silesia brought me in a multitude of Austrian prisoners. Where the country, which is the seat of war, is neutral, that party always has the advantage, which is able to obtain the good will of the people. In such a situation the strictest discipline must be observed, and plunder and marauding severely punished.

"The enemy must be charged with the worst designs against the country. If it is Protestant, profess yourselves on all occasions the defenders of the Protestant religion, and trumpet forth in the hearing of the lower orders of the people, whose simplicity is easily imposed on, the strongest sentiments of religious fanaticism. If on the other hand, the country is Catholic, your conversation must run on the propriety of universal toleration in matters of religion; profess the most moderate sentiments, and lament that priestcraft should have caused such difference between mankind, who are all agreed in the main principles of Christianity.

"In regard to detachments, &c. all that must be entirely regulated by the knowledge you acquire of the good or ill disposition of the country people toward you. From the untolerated religious sectaries, assistance may be derived; the gentry, let them pretend what they will, will betray you, so will the clergy. But the great ground on which to put yourself, is religious fanaticism. If

I can once succeed in exasperating a people, on the score of liberty of conscience, and can persuade them that they are oppressed by their clergy and gentry, you may rely on them. I call this bringing heaven and hell on my side. Taxes afford a good ground for agitating the people's minds; persuade them that in case of a change of government they would be taken off," &c. &c.

It is necessary to observe, that the foregoing instructions are not written by a Democrat; but that though they contain traits of the most sublime Jacobinism, they are a part of the ninth articles of secret instructions of the great Frederick of Prussia to his officers; of Frederick the King, Hero, Legislator and Philosopher; the goodness of whose heart, unchanged by greatness and prosperity, was equally conspicuous in his personal friendships, and his regard for the happiness and prosperity of his dominions. And it also appears hereby, that the French have not the merit of having discovered this new system of setting the world in a flame, and shaking established governments, as has been attributed to them, and which they arrogated to themselves.

When such measures are adopted by a character, to whom they are so uncongenial, as that above-mentioned, it only proves, that men's actions and principles are determined by the situations into which fortune throws them.

Every suggestion which is here laid down, as proper to instil into the minds of the subjects of a hostile Sovereign, is equally applicable to those
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of that Monarch from whom they proceed ; yet because the measure answers the emergency of the moment, it is adopted without any fear of a future retribution.

CHAP.

CHAP. XII.

On Frontiers in general—On Descents—And Passage of Rivers.

THE passage of rivers is so much connected with the defence of frontiers, and there is such a simplicity in the conduct of a descent, and the rules to be followed in the former case, that the two subjects of consideration may be, perhaps, not improperly thrown together. Since countries, as Poland, have no frontier that admits of defence, as has before been observed, to defend the margraviate of Brandenburg, the King of Prussia advances and takes possession of Wittemberg, why? because Brandenburg is a flat open country, and not defensible, except at Wittemberg.

Portugal has a weak frontier, because all the chains of mountains and all the rivers run at right angles with it, of course, parallel to the line of operations of the invader.

Whichever way rivers are observed to run by the map, it may be inferred the mountains and positions also run. In Alsace they are favourable to defend the country, and the French knew how to take advantage of them.

The sea is the frontier of England and Ireland, and the first defence, the British navy; but no statesman or soldier would risque the existence of the nation under his care, upon one security.

Notwith-

Notwithstanding the superiority of our navy, in every respect, there exists a possibility of France being, at a future day, equal or superior. If France made a descent on this country, she would not consider what became of her transports. It is much to be regretted, Mr. Pitt's plan of fortifying the dock-yards in the Channel, some years ago, was not carried into effect. It is surprising, that the good sense of the English would not see how much cheaper they might be defended by militia, in works of earth, than by sailors in ships of war; or the absurdity of first fitting and manning a ship for sea, and then being obliged to keep her rotting in harbour to defend the dock-yard. The superiority of the English navy is not from exclusive resources, but from its having very naturally, on account of its situation, turned its attention early to the sea, and in consequence, having got the start of the rest of Europe. But America and France have as good ports, as much timber, and may one day have as much trade. Had Louis the Fourteenth, instead of maintaining four hundred thousand men in arms, on earth, turned his thoughts to the sea, her navy might have been as powerful now.

For these reasons it is to be wished, more attention were paid to the defence of our coast.

A chain of telegraphes, from the north, from Galway, and Bantry, to the capital, would be very useful.

If a river is the frontier, and must be passed in face of an enemy, the following rules must be adhered to as close as possible, viz. choose a reentrant angle, your banks higher than the opposite ones, and place batteries on each flank. The night is also often a favourable time. What

Marshall

Marshall Saxe says of intrenchments, may be applied to what we have read of the passage of rivers, sometimes they succeed, "*Parceque la tete tourne aux hommes quand il leur arrive des choses, aux quels ils ne s'attendant pas,*"—the passage of rivers often succeeds, because it is not imagined that it will be attempted.

The best way to defend a river, says Maizeroy, is to have corps detached along it at certain distances, but near enough to join at the point of attack. The usual precautions to be taken in guarding a river are, to break up fords, destroy boats, watch the most likely places, namely, where the river forms a bend towards the enemy, and where another river runs into it on the enemy's side, by which they might send down pontoons, floats, &c. Where there are islands raise redoubts on them, and mount cannon.

Of descents, Maizeroy says, Retrenchments to guard against them are not only useless, but dangerous. So many places admit of a debarkation, it would be unnecessary to intrench the whole coast. The enemy will not present himself at a guarded place, except as a feint to divert. Every time the English descended on the coast of France, they did it with the greatest ease. All that can be done is, when the intention of the enemy is evident, assemble troops as soon as possible, they being, it is to be supposed, previously arranged for the purpose, and advance toward the enemy. If he is in the act of landing, he should be attacked without deliberation, and without heeding the prodigious fire of the covering fleet, which is not to be dreaded by troops on the shore and in movement; and once they come to close action, the enemy can make no more use of his fire. If you find him landed
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and in force, occupy some advantageous post, where he may be detained till the arrival of all the troops. If he means to establish himself in the country, he will come in great force, unless he expects to find them disposed in his favour*.

Redoubts upon a coast, if they have not cannon in them, are useless. As the enemy may disembark at low water, they should be made en barbette, and placed so as to have a cross fire. It is right to have points of appuy and rallying, fortified up the country. It appears that Maizeroy speaks only of the smaller sort of attacks. He adds the following important observation, The defence of a country does not consist in the number of fortresses, but in the zeal of the people, well-regulated finances, disciplined troops, and the facility of augmenting them whenever necessity requires.

The manœuvres our troops are taught, only serve to give them false ideas. Maizeroy says, to train troops, enterprizes of small importance must be undertaken,—Mais il faut prendre garde de s'y faire battre. A good rule.

* The French failed in their attempt on Sardinia, because they landed a very inconsiderable force, because the peasantry rushed down armed upon them, and because they took panick.

They were defeated at Salée, because they came up the river in their boats with the tide; when it ebbed they were left sticking in the mud, where they were assailed by the Moors and Arabs, and, unable to defend themselves, they were cut to pieces by them with their short swords. These are two strong instances of what a peasantry can do.

C H A P. XIII.

On the present State of Defence of the Country—The Force, and probable Distribution of it—And on the Expences and Necessities of the Campaign.

THE forces in Ireland may be estimated at upward of thirty thousand men, of whom twenty thousand might be brought into the field, in different parts of the kingdom. Probably ten thousand might, in case of an attack, be assembled. There is no train of artillery fit to take the field, equal to the exigencies of the country, nor are there magazines formed. It is supposed the cavalry could not take the field for want of forage.

There is a squadron of men of war at Cork.

It is supposed the troops will be encamped in small corps of five thousand each; one near Dublin, one in the south, and one in the north. For the transporting magazines, &c. the troops are entirely dependent on the people of the country, having no carriages attached to the army for that purpose, which is one inconvenience. There is no corps of pontoniers, on which account the army could pass rivers but on one column. It has been already observed, there are no fortresses in the country; there are also few engineers; nor have the military been in the practice of breaking ground. If it were possible that the whole army could assemble to oppose
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the enemy, and leave the country without troops to maintain internal peace, protect their magazines, communications, &c. such an army could not continue a month together for want of provisions.

An army of twenty thousand men, with their followers, the necessary horses, and adding only the small proportion of one thousand regular cavalry, would consume eighteen thousand barrels of corn, of all descriptions, every four weeks; besides this, it must have turf, straw, hay, and cattle. It would require fifteen thousand sheep, or two thousand head of black cattle, also, monthly; and would thus consume in that space of time, the produce of four thousand acres of land, and in the course of the campaign, of upward of twenty thousand acres, amounting in value, to upward of two hundred thousand pounds.

An army of a nominal forty thousand men, which to a certainty would not bring more than twenty thousand in the field, would cost while there, the first campaign, half a million sterling. If forty thousand effectives are necessary for the defence of the island, sixty thousand must be rated as the strength of the army, the additional expence may be calculated.

The camp equipage, and the year's stores before-hand, would require a sum of two millions, to put this country in a tolerable state of defence. One million must be added, for fortifying posts; and the casualties and contingencies, even the article of blankets, of which there must be a hundred thousand in store, comes to a large sum, and if the army are in the field, must be renewed every year. A less sum of money than four millions sterling, in the national treasury, would

would not be sufficient to carry an army thro' the first campaign. Twenty thousand men would require near two thousand horses, of all descriptions, in order to move from place to place.

Government should have a hundred thousand barrels of corn in store, in the country, for the use of the army.

When the late Gen. Edward Dalton, marched to the Low Countries, at the time the Emperor Joseph II. threatened Holland, his army was fed from the opposite side of the Rhine; a severe frost rendered it unnavigable, and when the supply of bread was exhausted, there was no remedy but to disband the army, with orders for every man to shift for himself. These orders were actually to have been issued, on the ensuing day, but a thaw fortunately taking place during the night, and again opening the communication, prevented the total separation of the army taking place.

C H A P. XIV.

Finances—Taxes—Revenues.

IF the French were to get possession of this country, they would probably act here, as they have done elsewhere—would respect private property, but rob the public treasure. The revenues they would seize here, are what originate from taxes, and those of the church.

Reckon the Hearth Tax at	- - -	£. 50,000 per ann.
The County Presentments amount, thro'		
the kingdom, to not less than	- - -	100,000
Tithes and Church Revenues	- - -	450,000
		<hr/>
		£. 600,000

A sum of money equal to the maintenance of 30,000 troops. Suppose all these taxes were, during the present war, given up, and instead thereof two shillings an acre on all arable and pasture land, laid on, to be expended in the defence of the country, deducting also for the public roads, necessary salaries, ecclesiastical and others. The goodness of our roads is a great misfortune, it would facilitate in the greatest degree the conquest of the country. Why should money be expended in making roads and building bridges, when we do not know how soon we must break them up? It would only be necessary to retain a few of the principal ones.

It would be better for the opulent classes at once to contribute liberally, by a free gift for the

the defence of the country; for what would the enemy probably do, if they gained a footing here? they would abolish, by a manifesto, all the above-mentioned taxes, which fall in this country solely on the poor, and instead of it lay a general tax on all property. They would be sure in such a measure to have the voice of the people with them*.

There are many other taxes from which revenue is drawn, but the above are what come particularly out of the pockets of the people; and an exoneration from which, would be most particularly felt and applauded by them. It must be admitted, that such a change in the system of any country is a very strong measure; those certainly ought never to be resorted to but in times of the greatest danger. People who think that is now the case, will probably be also of opinion, that it is now necessary for our own security, to be at least prepared to adopt something similar, if affairs do not very soon take a new turn; if they do not, there is no alternative in case of an attack, but submission; for if the spirit of the people is not roused in their own defence, if they are lukewarm and indifferent, it is impossible for the country to be defended by any army. There is no great hope from the convulsions in France, it is now a great military Republic, and will always be equally formidable externally, because its force is derived, not from the casual ability of a military King, or a great Statesman, but from the spirit which pervades

* Tithes are in great part lay property. In whatever way the money is levied, the clergy must be paid. Nothing here must be understood as trenching upon the maintenance of that body; but tithes, tho' a tax, are a transferable property.

the whole mass of the nation. Probably France may ultimately fall as Rome did, but it is likewise probable she may be in the mean time equally victorious. Rome fought with nations, which, tho' barbarous, breathed a spirit of patriotism, and were unanimous against the invader; but the French may say with Shakespeare, " We have met with foes who strike beside us."

CHAP. XV.

Miscellaneous Observations.

AN enemy's army of 50,000 men, would consume in the various articles of the produce of the soil, as much as would amount weekly to upward of three thousand acres. These articles of subsistence must be obtained, either methodically, thro' the means of the constituted authorities of the country, which would be attended with least misery, or by means of pillage. Whatever a retiring army may do, it is impossible an advancing one could subsist a day upon the wild system of rapine.

An invader's object is to get possession of the country as soon as he can; but this is not done until the seat of government is in his power. Let him have what footing in the country he will, until he gains that, the vital principle remains unextinguished, and the body will perform its functions. Dublin, as the capital and seat of government, would of course be the object of attack; but there is an additional reason, it would be necessary for them to gain the east coast of the kingdom, fortify Dublin, Drogheda, &c. and there form their frontier against England.

Previous to Lord Howe's action with the French, tho' both fleets endeavoured their utmost to come to it, they were three days in sight of each other, without being able to do so.

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This proves the uncertainty of our reliance on security from the sea. What might not have been effected by a fleet of transports during that time?

If this country became the theatre of war, whichever party had the advantage, Ireland would be trampled to pieces in the struggle. A very few individuals make by war; the country which is the seat of it is beggared.

Perhaps it would be well that the Irish mob knew a victorious army, as well French as any other, suffers no people to pillage but themselves; the existence of a conquering army depends on the security of property, which it will always protect, in order to plunder it at leisure.

On the appearance of the enemy on any part of the coast, the cavalry should immediately drive all the cattle, and every thing moveable, behind the grand cordon, and destroy every thing which they could not remove. In short, all between the grand cordon and the enemy, should be made a desert; but the people should be indemnified. It is evident, nothing but the last necessity should induce such strong measures; but in such a case it is always done, and is unavoidable.

In a system of defence, possibilities, and not probabilities alone, must be guarded against. Sometimes an enemy will not attack in the part we think probable, but on the contrary, where we may think impossible. But it is a weakness to suppose any thing impossible to an active enemy.

To recapitulate in a few words, that which is necessary to put this country in a state of de-

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fence;

fence; the first article is money, secondly officers.

An army fully equipped, with its equipage, field artillery, corps of pontoniers, staff, and hospital properly appointed; this army to consist of forty thousand *effective* men (infantry), and two thousand cavalry, a corps of engineers well acquainted with the country, and a full year's provision before-hand of all kinds of stores, with a train of carriages and horses, to enable troops, artillery, &c. to move, without being at the mercy of the people of the country. Lastly, we should have unanimity among ourselves.

Our army consists of disjointed corps, unused to the system of acting in great bodies; nor is there any probability of a regular organization of it taking place. In addition to this, the regular troops only enter it on the east side, to embark from it on the west. Manœuvres in great bodies are unknown to our troops.

Parties of cavalry should never be sent out in this country, except sustained by infantry.

It is unfortunately too true, that those men who despise danger most, when at a distance, have the strongest sense of it when it is at hand. Courage may be the effect of constitution, but it is reflection gives firmness.

Let every person of property just revolve seriously in his mind, upon what he would do, on hearing an enemy was landed in the country, and in force; and remember what Marshal Saxe says: *Que la tête tourne aux hommes, quand il leur arrive des choses aux quels ils ne s'attendoient pas.*

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